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ABSTRACT  
   
Over the last few decades, the western United States has experienced more 
extreme wildland fire events, remarkable for their size and severity. The 
frequency, intensity, and size of wildfires is projected to only increase, with 
severe consequences for biodiversity, ecosystem services, human property, and 
more broadly, the sustainability of western forests. These trends are the result of a 
complex suite of factors including, past land-use policies, fire suppression, 
climate change, and human development. To protect fire-adapted ecosystems 
from further damage, fuel reduction and fire reintroduction are required over large 
landscapes, necessitating government agencies, landowners, and other interests to 
work together. In response, collaborative fire restoration efforts are forming to 
carry out this much needed work. This research takes a multi-level approach to 
understanding these new models for fire management and restoration. 
Collaborative, landscape-level approaches to fire reintroduction are a direct 
response to a failure in past policies and approaches, which necessitates a 
discussion of why these policies allowed fires to grow worse and why 
management failed to effectively prevent this from happening. Thus, a historical 
analysis of wildland fire policy and management constitutes one layer in this 
analysis. Collaborative frameworks to wildland fire reintroduction are few and far 
between, which obliges a discussion of how collaboration works and why it may 
be necessary. An in-depth case study of FireScape, a collaborative effort in 
southeastern Arizona to restore wildfire completes this analysis and provides a 
discussion of the challenges, benefits, and implications of these new approaches. 
  ii 
The context for this case study is southeastern Arizona's Sky Islands. The Sky 
Islands region spans the U.S. Mexico borderlands and is a biodiversity hotspot, 
making it an ideal place to explore the interactions between humans and natural 
systems. The more recent emphasis on collaboration in wildfire management has 
yet to be fully explored in other academic circles. Collaboration is essential in fire 
restoration and provides one pathway to solve complex natural resource 
management issues. 
  iii 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 At the close of 2011, Arizona broke a record that was more cause for 
alarm than celebration.  Throughout the course of the dry, hot summer, over 1,500 
fires burned nearly one million acres of forests and grasslands, in what became 
the state’s largest wildland fire season on record (Radnovich, 2011). The Wallow 
fire alone burned 538,049 acres, securing its title as Arizona’s largest wildfire 
ever. As it burned through over 800 square miles in eastern Arizona, the Wallow 
fire made national headlines, blanketed Albuquerque, over 200 miles away, in 
smoke and ash, and required nearly $109 million to suppress (Arizona Emergency 
Information Network, 2011).  While the Wallow fire consumed acreage in 
northeastern Arizona, the Horseshoe II and Monument fires, though less 
publicized, burned in southeastern Arizona’s Sky Islands. The Horseshoe II fire 
became the state’s fourth largest wildfire, burning 222,954 acres and requiring 50 
million dollars to contain (Incident Information System, 2011). The Monument 
Fire, though smaller in size at 32,526 acres, forced the evacuation of 10,000 
residents and destroyed almost 60 homes and 6 businesses (Sulphur Springs 
Valley Electric Cooperative, 2011). The Horseshoe II and Monument fires 
combined required over 70 million dollars in suppression costs, but this figure 
does not reflect the damage to private property, the impacts on ranching and 
tourism operations, and the costs incurred by municipalities and local fire 
protection operations. The long-term costs to soils, wildlife habitat, watersheds, 
and overall ecosystem structure and function are yet to be fully understood.  
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 Over the last few decades, the western United States has experienced more 
extreme wildland fire events, remarkable for their size and severity (Westerling, 
Hidalgo, Cayan, & Swetnam, 2006; Whitlock, 2004).  Scientific studies project 
that the frequency, intensity, and size of wildfires will only increase, with severe 
consequences for biodiversity, human property, and more broadly, the 
sustainability of western forests (Covington 2000; Dombeck, Wood & Williams 
2003).  There are over 360 million acres of forested lands in the West and fire has 
played and continues to play a critical evolutionary and ecological role throughout 
these landscapes (Noss, Franklin, Baker, Schoennagel, & Mogel, 2006; Western 
Forestry Leadership Coalition [WFLC], 2010;).  It is important to recognize that 
these forested lands vary dramatically in their structure, composition, and 
incidentally in their fire regime, defined as the prevailing fire frequency and 
intensity that characterizes ecological types.  Not all forest types are at risk of 
severe wildfire, but significant expanses of forests within the arid intermountain 
west and southwest United States are at risk of increased high-severity fire (Noss 
et al., 2006).  Given these trends, it is critical to understand what made these 
forests susceptible to these risks.  Decades of aggressive fire suppression, 
combined with other activities such as logging and ranching, have disrupted fire 
and changed the nature of this vital ecological process (Agee, 1997).  These 
activities have led to the over-accumulation of vegetation on forested lands, 
increasing the amount of fuels available to wildfires and increasing their risk of 
high-severity fire (Noss et al., 2006).   
 
3 
 The issue is exacerbated by changes in land use and climate, presenting a 
complex challenge for land managers, scientists, and the public (Steelman & 
Burke, 2011). The social and ecological implications of wildland fire are 
profound; these large fires strain agency budgets, endanger communities, destroy 
wildlife habitat, and threaten the integrity of watersheds, soils, and overall forest 
integrity (Arno and Fiedler, 2005). For example, the United States Forest Service 
(USFS) annual expenditures for suppression of wildland fires are steadily on the 
rise (Pyne, 2010, 55-56).  Since 2000, wildland fires require well over one billion 
dollars to suppress. These suppression costs grossly underestimate the longer-term 
and indirect costs of wildland fire.  In a 2010 study of six particularly large and 
severe western fires, the Western Forestry Leadership Coalition found that longer 
term rehabilitation costs and indirect costs, such as losses in tax revenue and job 
losses, put the true cost of wildland fires at much higher figures (WFLC, 2010).  
For example, an analysis of the 2002 Rodeo-Chedeski fire in Arizona found that 
the 46 million dollar suppression costs only represented 15% of the true costs 
when rehabilitation costs, private property damage, and other indirect costs were 
accounted.  This trend towards larger and more severe wildfires presents one of 
the most complex and controversial natural resource management problems in the 
western United States (Noss et al., 2006).  It is not merely an issue of fuel 
accumulation, or fire policy, or land use, or climate change, although all of these 
are factors; it is a problem with multiple social and ecological dimensions  
(Steelman & Burke, 2011).  
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 The landscape of the American West is one of intermixed ownership, but 
federally managed lands make up roughly half of the West’s vast landscapes (Nie, 
2008).  If these large fires were placed on a map, it would become apparent that a 
majority of wildland fires in the West occur on public lands (Pyne, 2010).  Nearly 
60% of forested lands in the West are publicly owned and managed by various 
federal agencies, namely, the United States Forest Service (WGA, 2008).  Other 
federal agencies, such as the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and National 
Park Service (NPS), as well as individual states manage forested lands.  Privately 
owned and managed forests make up the remainder.  There are an estimated 190 
million acres of federal forest and rangelands at risk of severe wildfire (Schmidt 
et al., 2002).  Fire does not adhere to human boundaries however, and lands 
adjacent to national forests or national parks, such as private lands, state lands, 
and tribal lands are also at risk.  Organized fire management developed 
historically on public lands, and public lands are the context for the policy 
reforms and political controversies surrounding fire (Pyne, 2010).   
 Fire management in America has a tumultuous history.  Starting at the turn 
of century, President Theodore Roosevelt placed recently created forest reserve 
under the jurisdiction of an agency created in 1905 to manage those forests, the 
United States Forest Service.  From this point forward, the USFS pursued fire 
suppression on national forests with unparalleled zeal.  For the next half-century, 
fire suppression reigned supreme.  Suppression was institutionalized through 
policy, supported through generous funding allocations, and cemented through 
impressive infrastructure.  Starting in the 1960s, new models for fire management 
 
5 
emerged as environmental awareness, public interest in natural resource 
management, and evidence from the study of fire and forest ecology converged.  
These new models represented polar opposites to the entrenched fire-suppression 
dogma.  The language in modern fire policies and fire management plans now 
acknowledges the ecological necessity of fire and instead calls for fire 
“reintroduction” in order to restore forest ecosystems.1  
 Despite setbacks, and a constant redefining of wildland fire management 
and policy, most fire managers and fire ecologists agree that hazardous fuel 
reduction is necessary to allow for fire reintroduction and to restore healthy 
landscapes (Dombeck, Wood & Williams, 2003).   Scientists and policy makers 
agree that better management is needed, but there is still debate regarding what 
constitutes better management (Allen et al., 2002).  Fire restoration can be 
accomplished through a variety of tactics, each with its own advantages and 
disadvantages (Pyne, 2010, p. 69).  Increasingly, national and state policies and 
recommendations call for greater collaboration between stakeholders to meet the 
goals of fire restoration, but accomplishing these goals remains a difficult 
challenge. The statistics presented at the start of the introduction represent how 
                                                
1 Though fire reintroduction or fire restoration may be used interchangeably, fire reintroduction is 
one method to achieve broader restoration of the composition, structure, and dynamics of forests 
(Palmer, Falk, and Zedler, 2006).  More formally, “ecological restoration aims to enhance the 
resilience and sustainability of forests through treatments that incrementally return the ecosystem 
to a state that is within a historic range of conditions” (Allen et all; 2002, 1421). Forest restoration 
can entail restoring structure and/or restoring the processes that create and maintain that structure, 
such as fire (Noss et al., 2006). In the dry, fire-adapted forests of the West, the reintroduction of 
fire is essential to achieving restoration goals (Allen et al, 2002).  The practice has experienced a 
long evolution; “the concept of restoring more natural conditions in western forests developed 
slowly, in tandem with the emerging disciplines of forest and fire ecology” (Arno and Fiedler, 
2005, p 9). 
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fire is commonly reported: acres burned, costs incurred, and damage wrought 
dominate media coverage of wildland fires.  These figures fail to capture fire 
management’s long history, the progress and setbacks in creating effective policy, 
the advancements in our understanding of fire behavior, and the new approaches 
being applied in large-scale experiments throughout the West.  In truth, fire is a 
critical and desperately needed ecological process in western forests, which 
underscores a subtle paradox; more of the right kind of fire is ultimately better for 
western forests. 
 Though many within the fire community have critiqued land management 
agencies for the past mishandling of fire, they have also called for socially 
acceptable and ecologically sound management that reintroduces fire as a crucial 
ecological process while protecting ecosystem health and local communities 
(Dombeck, Williams, & Wood, 2004). One of the most challenging goals of fire 
management of this kind is to devise landscape-level planning that improves 
ecological function and minimizes the social and economic costs associated with 
fire (Hirsch et al., 2001). However, landscape-level reintroduction often requires 
efforts that work across jurisdictional boundaries. To meet these challenges, 
collaboration between federal agencies, state governments, and the public is on 
the rise (Dombeck, Williams, & Wood, 2004).  Agencies, environmental groups, 
and private landowners are coming together, pooling resources, and committing to 
carrying out a variety of treatments across entire landscapes to meet multiple 
goals of increased forest health and decreased fire risk.  Collaborative fire 
management is part of a larger movement in the United States towards a style of 
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natural resource management that embraces multiparty efforts to collectively 
address and solve complex natural resource management issues (Wondolleck and 
Yaffee, 2000).  The Forest Service estimates that 73 million acres of national 
forest lands and 397 million acres across all ownerships, including private lands, 
are in need of treatments to reduce fuel accumulation and risk of severe fire2 
(USDA Forest Service, 2000).  Despite the monumental task collaborative fire 
reintroduction efforts are forming in response to the need for more treatments of 
bigger size.  These innovative approaches deserve more attention and this 
research responds to this need.   
 This thesis takes a holistic approach to understanding these new models 
for fire management and restoration.  Collaborative, landscape-level approaches 
to fire reintroduction are a direct response to a failure in past policies and 
approaches, which necessitates a discussion of why these policies allowed fires to 
grow worse and why management failed to effectively prevent this from 
happening.  Thus a historical analysis of wildland fire policy constitutes one layer 
in this analysis.  Collaborative frameworks to wildland fire reintroduction are few 
and far between, which obliges a discussion of how collaboration works and why 
it may be necessary.  The context for this analysis is Arizona, and in particular, 
southeastern Arizona’s Sky Islands.  This region spans the U.S. Mexico 
borderlands and boasts unparalleled biological diversity, making it an ideal place 
to explore the interactions between human and natural systems.   
                                                
2 It is important to note that multiple treatments over multiple years are needed to restore forest 
structure and reduce risk of severe fire (Noss et al., 2006).  
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   The Sky Islands are a region of forested mountains situated amongst arid 
lowlands in the U.S/Mexico borderlands.  The United States Forest Service 
(USFS) manages most of the forested ranges that occupy higher elevations north 
of the border, but there are also parcels of private lands and lands managed by 
other federal and state agencies within and surrounding national forest 
boundaries.  Adjacent lands and intervening valleys include tribal, private, 
Arizona State Trust, military, Bureau of Land Management (BLM), national park, 
and state park lands.  Given this patchwork nature of landownerships, 
collaboration across administrative boundaries is essential if fire reintroduction on 
a landscape level is the goal.  The Coronado National Forest created the FireScape 
program to implement ecologically sound, landscape-level, collaborative fire 
management in several Sky Island ranges.  The program aims to reintroduce and 
restore fire as a vital ecological process on a landscape level. 
 Chapter 2 examines the prominent influences on the landscapes within the 
Sky Island region. The landscapes we study in the present are mosaics of past 
land use and natural disturbance events.  Biophysical, ecological, and human 
processes shape the “nature” of these landscapes over time.  This chapter will 
synthesize the region’s human and ecological changes, especially as they relate to 
fire and forest management.  A discussion of early forest and fire management, 
including the formation of the nation’s first forest reserves and organized fire 
suppression under the Forest Service support this analysis.  This discussion will 
set the stage for an overview of the region’s modern era in which I analyze how 
more recent changes such as population growth and exurban development 
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complicate fire management.  I end chapter two with a discussion of what these 
social and ecological conditions mean for collaborative fire management in the 
region.  This chapter will provide the background discussion necessary to 
appreciate the complexity and diversity of southeastern Arizona’s borderlands 
region.   
 Chapter 3 analyzes the evolution of modern wildland fire policy at the 
national level, from the 1960s to the present.  Starting in this period, significant 
changes to wildland fire policy and practice occurred, and many of these changes 
set the stage for efforts like FireScape to eventually emerge.  Stephen Pyne 
termed this period, “fire’s cultural revolution” (Pyne, 2010, p. 46).  There is 
appreciable scholarship on U.S. wildland fire management and policy, so this 
discussion aims to point out key changes in policy and practices that are relevant 
to the Firescape effort, especially the rise of collaborative approaches in fire 
management.  This more recent emphasis on collaboration has yet to be fully 
explored in other academic circles.  Chapter three closes with a synthesis of the 
recommendations from policy experts, managers, and ecologists for moving 
forward. This synthesis discussion sets the stage for a case study of the FireScape 
approach in Chapter 4.   
 As part of this research, I conducted a series of interviews with members 
of the Chiricahua FireScape team and focused my questions on the collaborative 
process, challenges to this process, and the strategies employed by FireScape 
personnel to accomplish restoration objectives.  I was interested in the roles 
members play and in the factors that have both constrained and facilitated the 
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effort. This type of information is valuable given the tendency of studies on 
collaboration to evaluate the success of collaboration instead of developing an 
understanding of collaboration as a process (Conley and Moote, 2003). Other 
theoretical pursuits on collaborative natural resource management seek to 
understand its benefits, drawbacks, successes, and outcomes. Collaborative fire 
management presents an innovative and promising strategy for managing fire on a 
landscape level, but it is important to understand the challenges, especially if 
collaboration continues to be presented as a pathway to better outcomes.  A 
portion of this discussion in Chapter 4 will also delve into FireScape’s 
environmental review process under the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA).  FireScape has employed landscape-level, Environmental Assessments 
to inform and plan future treatments. I will include a discussion of the challenges 
and benefits of landscape planning in this fashion.  Together, chapters 3 and 4 
provide a discussion of how the responses to wildland fire at the national level 
and local level differ and converge.  
 The conclusion (chapter 5) focuses on a question that has eluded forest 
and fire managers for decades: what is the best way to deal with the wildland fire 
issue in the West?  Whether at the national level or at the local level through 
dozens of collaborative projects, it appears that collaborative approaches to 
wildfire planning, response, suppression, rehabilitation, and restoration are on the 
rise.  This study analyzes how we have arrived here and identifies the conditions 
that enhance the chance of success for collaboration and those that pose obstacles 
to success. 
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 The multiplying threats on western forests merit our attention.  Western 
forests provide key ecosystem services that support life and enhance human 
communities (Dombeck, Wood & Williams, 2003).  Forests create and maintain 
soils, improve air quality, regulate climate, capture and store carbon, and provide 
aesthetic enjoyment and spiritual renewal (Dombeck, Wood, & Williams, 2003).  
Forests protect watersheds and provide freshwater, which is an especially 
important service in the arid West (Jones et al, 2009). Unfortunately, larger and 
more severe wildland fires are among the greater threats to watershed health and 
ecological integrity of western lands, with profound implications for social and 
ecological sustainability (Dombeck, Wood, & Williams, 2003).  One of the 
fundamental pursuits of sustainability is to support and enhance ecosystems while 
meeting human needs.  Though this research highlights a particular effort in a 
particular place to protect the ecological integrity of a unique region, it contains 
lessons and insights for moving forward towards this broader sustainability goal.   
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Chapter 2 
THE SKY ISLANDS: PAST AND PRESENT 
Introduction 
 In many of the Western landscapes where fire management has become a 
focal issue, human activities have interfered with the way fire operates on the 
landscape.  Southeastern Arizona’s Sky Islands have also been subject to a series 
of events within the last 150 years that have significantly altered the way fire 
behaves on the land.  To understand the magnitude of these changes requires 
knowledge of how fire historically, or naturally, behaved and a complementary 
understanding of the degree of departure from this baseline.  According to 
prominent southwestern fire ecologists, “if we are going to reintroduce fire 
processes, we need to learn as much as possible about long-term fire history” 
(Swetnam & Baisan, 1996, p 12).  This knowledge is crucial as it provides the 
foundation for modern fire management and the justification for fire 
reintroduction (Keeley et al., 2009).  To understand these changes in a holistic 
manner requires both ecological and historical perspectives.  A succinct historical 
analysis will explain how human actions altered Sky Island landscapes and a 
review of scientific studies will discuss the ecological significance of these 
actions.  However, since the primary focus of this work is on contemporary 
restoration efforts, this chapter will close with a discussion of how aspects of the 
modern management context, such as land ownership patterns, exurban 
development and anthropogenic climate change, influence present-day fire 
management and restoration efforts.  Thus, this chapter will present a broad 
 
13 
background on the important cultural and ecological shifts in the region starting 
from the mid 1800s to the present day.  The Sky Islands are a reflection of past 
land uses and there is little doubt that current land uses and practices will continue 
to shape their ecological character. 
 There are three important concepts that need clarification before a 
discussion on Sky Island fire history can proceed: historical range of variability, 
fire regime, and fire regime condition class.  Historical range of variability (HRV) 
describes the range of conditions and processes that characterize particular 
ecosystems over specified time periods. In most cases, historical range of 
variability refers to the range of conditions present prior to Euro-American 
settlement (Keeley et al., 2009).  The concept is used to describe an ecosystem’s 
structure, composition, and processes as they vary over time (Morgan and 
Parsons, 2001). HRV is used as a frame of reference to evaluate recent and 
potential ecosystem change and it contributes to natural resource management by 
helping managers identify management and restoration goals (Keeley et al., 2009; 
Swetnam, Allen & Betancourt, 1999).  Oftentimes, the goal of restoration is to 
help forests attain a structure and composition that is within its historical range of 
variability (Allen et al., 2002).  
 In fire-adapted ecosystems where fire suppression has led to changes in 
the structure and composition of forests, high-severity fires further threaten the 
diversity and integrity of forests.  Wildfires can irreparably harm soils and remove 
entire stands of forests, with profound implications for wildlife habitat, watershed 
protection, and climate regulation.  There is little disagreement that where fire 
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played a critical role in the evolution and maintenance of ecosystems, restoration 
of fire is crucial. According to Arno and Fielder (2005), fire restoration should be 
of utmost importance to “those concerned with the long-term ecological integrity 
of forests, protection of life and property, and the sensible use of public funds” (p. 
10).   
 Historical range of variability is sometimes criticized for implying that a 
certain past condition is desirable and attainable (Egan & Howell, 2001).  
Ecologists acknowledge the difficulty in precisely achieving a desired past 
condition (Noss et al., 2006).  Furthermore, ecosystems may be so degraded that 
restoring them to a condition within their HRV is both ecologically and 
economically impractical (Egan & Howell, 2001).  As Falk (1990) puts it, 
“restoration uses the past not as a goal but as a reference point for the future. If we 
seek to recreate the temperate forests, tall grass savannas, or desert communities 
of centuries past, it is not to turn back the evolutionary clock but to set it ticking 
again” (p. 71).  Another complicating factor is the implication of rapid climate 
change.  The concern is that since ecosystems evolved under different climatic 
conditions, HRV may not be a practical objective given the new and rapidly 
changing climatic conditions.  Despite these challenges, HRV is useful as a 
starting point to inform management and restoration plans and goals (Noss et al., 
2006).  
 Fire regimes are the fire patterns that occurred over extended periods of 
time in the absence of modern human intervention (Keeley et al., 2009).  Fire 
regimes are traditionally defined by a particular ecosystem’s fire frequency, 
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intensity, and seasonality (Keeley et al., 2009).3  Humans impact fire regimes in a 
variety of ways and, oftentimes, a collection of practices interact to influence fire 
regimes (Keeley et al., 2009). Fire ecologists use fire regime analysis as a 
foundation for understanding historic fire behavior and the degree of departure 
from these historical conditions (Keeley et al., 2009). To aid in the description of 
fire regimes, fire ecologists have developed a coarse-scale classification scheme 
for natural fire regimes based on fire frequency and severity (Schmidt et al, 2002).  
There are five basic fire regimes, classified by the fire return interval, fuels, fire 
intensity, and fire effects (Schmidt et al., 2002).  These classifications are used as 
a baseline to determine the degree of departure from a fire regime as the result of 
human activities (Keeley et al., 2009). The degree of departure is often described 
by another classification scheme known as a fire regime condition class (FRCC) 
(Hahn & Bunnell, 2001).  This scheme contains three condition classes: class 1 
ecosystems exhibit fire regimes that are within the historic range of variability, 
class 2 reflect a moderate departure from historic fire regimes, and class 3 
ecosystems represent high departure.  The degree of departure can be quantified 
in terms of fuel composition, fire frequency or severity.  Condition class 2, and 
especially class 3, may require moderate to high levels of active management to 
restore more natural fire regimes.  Throughout the West, millions of acres of 
forested lands exist within class 2 and class 3 (Schmidt et al., 2002).   
 Ecological restoration is as much about understanding the past as it is 
about “creating the future” (Falk, 1990, p. 71).  Sayre (2010) suggests that since 
                                                
3 Fire regimes are also shaped by biophysical conditions such as climate and topography (Keeley 
et al., 2009). 
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ecological restoration uses the conditions and/or processes of past ecological 
states as a reference point, questions regarding humanity’s influences on these 
ecosystems over time naturally arise. FireScape in essence is a collaborative effort 
to restore ecological conditions and processes that more closely resemble those 
that existed prior to Anglo-American settlement (USFS, 2011b). Thus, it is 
appropriate to analyze how the arrival of Anglo-Americans and the accompanying 
changes in land-use and fire management transformed the region.   
The Sky Islands 
 FireScape focuses on a collection of forested mountain ranges within an 
area in southeastern Arizona known as the Sky Islands. Arizona’s Sky Islands are 
a part of regional network of forested mountains separated by arid valleys 
spanning the borderlands region in southeastern Arizona, southwestern New 
Mexico, and northern Mexico.  There are roughly twenty sky islands in Arizona 
and the Coronado National Forest manages fourteen sky island ranges.  The 
region is a convergence zone where tropical, subtropical, and temperate climates 
and four major bioregions meet: The Rocky Mountains of the United States, the 
Sierra Madre Occidental of Mexico, and the Chihuahuan and Sonoran Deserts 
(Felger & Wilson, 1995). The intersections of flora and faunas and the region’s 
basin and range topography have created unique assemblages of species that are 
found together nowhere else in North America (Warshall, 1995). Species at the 
northernmost and southernmost reaches of their ranges combine, making the Sky 
Islands one of the most biologically diverse areas in the United States (Felger & 
Wilson, 1995). Eight distinct vegetation types have been described in the Sky 
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Islands, including montane evergreen forest, oak-coniferous evergreen woodland, 
tropical deciduous forest, oak savanna, chaparral, short grass prairie, subtropical 
thornscrub, and subtropical desert (Brown, Valone, & Curtin, 1997). These 
vegetation types stratify along elevation gradients, so that each mountain range in 
the Sky Islands boasts multiple ecological zones.  It is a landscape of steep 
contrasts and unique ecological assemblages with an equally intriguing human 
history (Morehouse et al., 2008; Ricketts et al., 1999).  Southeastern Arizona’s 
Sky Islands have changed tremendously over time, both culturally and 
biophysically (Hirt, 1989).  Though the region has been shaped by geological 
processes and changing climate for millennia, more recent changes in the 
landscape were shaped predominantly by cultural factors, primarily, the arrival of 
Anglo-Americans (Hirt, 1989, p. 180). 
 The Sky Islands have a long human history with Apache, Spanish, and 
Mexican influences (Wilson, 1995). The United States acquired southeastern 
Arizona and southwestern New Mexico from Mexico in 1854 with the Gadsden 
Purchase.  Shortly after, Anglo-American entrepreneurs began infiltrating the 
region, seeking economic opportunity (Hirt, 1989).  According to both historians 
and scientists, the ideologies, institutions, and practices of Anglo-Americans 
profoundly altered the region’s cultural and ecological makeup, including the 
region’s fire regimes (Hirt, 1989; Warshall, 1995). Although settlement and 
economic development of American frontier regions is a defining characteristic of 
America’s national identity, it was only made possible once indigenous 
inhabitants were subjugated and removed. In the southwestern borderlands, 
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several bands of Apaches occupied the region prior to Anglo-American arrival. 
The Apaches used fire as an ecological tool to drive game, encourage the growth 
of forage for game animals, and create forest openings (Hirt, 1989; Pyne 1982,).  
It is generally agreed the Apaches lived within the region’s existing fire regime 
and likely encouraged fire in certain places during certain periods (Pyne, 1982; 
Seklecki et al., 1996). The US government finally defeated and removed the 
Apaches in 1886, and made the ample grasslands and forested areas available to 
further Anglo-American settlement (Hirt, 1989, p. 176-177). 
 The new settlers brought practices and economies that set the Sky Islands 
on a new trajectory.  Mining and ranching were the first economic booms in the 
region and logging soon followed (Bahre, 1991).  Mineral discoveries brought 
scores of prospectors into the forested ranges.  Starting in the 1870s, the industry 
underwent a series of boom and bust cycles as new deposits were pursued and 
abandoned (Wilson, 1995).  Timber operations overlapped with the mining boom 
as logging expanded in the Chiricahua, Santa Rita, Huachuca, and Santa Catalina 
mountains to provide the needed wood for mining and growing settlements 
(Wilson, 1995, p. 203-206).  The ranching industry also picked up momentum in 
the 1870s and by the 1890s, the expansive grassland valleys were overstocked 
with cattle (Hirt, 1989; Wilson, 1995).  Ranchers used the forests and meadows of 
the Sky Islands as much as the grassy valleys, and by 1908, the forested 
landscapes were also overstocked (Allen, 1989, p. 16). These extensive cattle 
herds removed the fine fuels that typically carried low-intensity surface fires, 
which decreased the chance of both fire ignition and spread (Swetnam, Baisan, & 
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Kaib, 2001).  The combination of mining, timber, and ranching operations during 
the 1880s created a substantial human footprint in the region and exerted 
tremendous change to the region (Wilson, 1995; Warshall, 1995).  Combined, 
these land uses were the start of the virtual cessation of fire in the Sky Islands.  
 In addition to new land uses, the Anglo Americans brought new attitudes 
towards fire. These new arrivals failed to understand the ecological function and 
benefits of fires and instead viewed forest fires as a destructive threat to valuable 
resources (Bahre, 1991). These land use practices were closely tied to Anglo 
American desires to increase productivity of forage and timber.  To protect 
property and enhance productivity within forests, these new arrivals carried out 
the earliest form of fire suppression in the region; ironically, these practices 
contributed to fuel accumulation and the threat of destructive wildfires over time 
(Hirt, 1989).  Reconstructions of fire regimes in the region reveal that changes in 
land use, first grazing and then fire suppression, were the dominant factors in the 
removal of surface fires and the disruption of the fire regimes in the Sky Islands 
(Swetnam, Baisan, & Kaib, 2001).  
 A reshaping of land ownership soon followed these land use practices. At 
the turn of the century, an era of federal land management commenced in the 
region.  Starting in 1891, various presidents began establishing forests reserves 
under presidential proclamation (Pyne, 2010).  Congress formed the modern day 
Forest Service in 1905 and gave it authority over the reserves (renamed “national 
forests” two years later).  Between 1902 and 1907, several forest reserves were 
established in southern Arizona.  These reserves were combined in 1908 form the 
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newly designed Coronado National Forest in 1908 (Otis et al. 1986, 156). A few 
more additions, including the Chiricahua Mountains in 1912 and the Santa Teresa, 
Galiuro, and Pinaleno Mountains in 1953, formed what is now the 1.7 million 
acre Coronado National Forest (Allen, 1989, p. 14).  With more than a hundred 
millions of acres of national forests to protect nationwide, fire management 
quickly became a focal issue within the Forest Service (Pyne, 1982).  For a 
substantial part of its tenure as the primary land manager of forested lands, the 
Forest Service viewed wildland fire as a resource threat and aggressively 
suppressed it across the West.  Congress provided a generously flexible funding 
mechanism by passing an act in 1908 that allowed the Forest Service to overspend 
its yearly budget in times of emergency fire suppression (Pyne, 1982).  This 
“blank check” for suppression allowed the agency to aggressively suppress fire 
without concerning itself too much with the costs (O’Toole, 2002).  
 Organized fire suppression by the Forest Service began slowly, partly 
because the infrastructure needed to enable fire suppression was not yet in place 
(Pyne, 1982).  Much of this infrastructure, such as lookout towers, trails, and 
guard stations, were the result of the activities of the Civilian Conservation Corps 
in the 1930s (Pyne, 1982).  The first CCC camp in the Southwest was built in the 
Chiricahua Mountains (Allen, 1989, p. 18).  The CCC also provided firefighting 
manpower in the early years of the Forest Service (Otis et al, 1986).  By the 
1930s, all of the fire lookouts on the Coronado National Forest were CCC 
enrollees (Otis et al., 1986, p. 155).   The CCC substantially increased the Forest 
Service’s ability to suppress fires (Williams, 2000). 
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 With the infrastructure in place to begin aggressively suppressing fires, the 
agency’s “10 a.m. policy” provided the institutional support.  Adopted in 1935, 
the policy stipulated that all fires were to be extinguished by 10 a.m. the day 
following discovery of the fire (Pyne, 2010). This policy was as unambiguous as 
fire policy could possibly be. The Forest Service also took its case to the 
American people and created the famed “Smokey the Bear” advertising campaign 
to enlist the public’s support in their fight against fire. Adding in congressional 
support in the form of funding, fire suppression saw its greatest success from 
1940 to 1955 (Pyne, 2010).  The Forest Service’s ability to respond quickly, 
mobilize resources, and aggressively fight fire was impressive (Hudson, 2011, p. 
18).  However, it was difficult to maintain because it only reduced the probability 
of fire in the short term (Holling and Meffe, 1996).  
 One of the first challenges the Forest Service faced in the region was 
managing livestock grazing. Many ranchers had overstocked their ranges, causing 
soil erosion and declines in rangeland productivity and watershed health (Bahre, 
1991). Slowly, more effective assessments of range carrying capacity, reductions 
in stocking levels, more active management practices, and more expertise in range 
management developed (Allen, 1989, p. 17-18).  However, the cumulative 
impacts of overgrazing and fire suppression greatly reduced fire frequencies and 
caused substantial changes in the structure and composition of lands in the 
Coronado National Forest (Gottfried et al., 2009).  
Insights From Fire Science 
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 A majority of our knowledge on historical fire regimes is provided by 
dendrochronology, or tree ring analysis.  By analyzing fire scars in the growth 
rings of old trees, scientists can reconstruct past fire histories (Swetnam, Allen, & 
Betancourt, 1999).  There are limitations to this method; for instance, it is difficult 
to extrapolate past fire sizes. Nevertheless, it does provide a coarse understanding 
of how fire once operated on the landscape. These fire histories, or fire 
chronologies as they are sometimes called, are widely used to inform fire 
reintroduction (Swetnam, Allen, & Betancourt, 1999). Extensive research on Sky 
Island ecosystems has allowed scientists to recreate the historic fire regimes for a 
number of study sites throughout the region.  These studies clearly show that prior 
to European arrival, frequent, low-intensity surface fires characterized nearly all 
of the ecosystems in the Sky Island region (Swetnam, Baisan, & Kaib, 2001). A 
2006 analysis by The Nature Conservancy shows that prior to Anglo-American 
involvement, fire occurred frequently, on the average of every 2-22 years, in Sky 
Island ecosystems. The importance of fire in maintaining the structure and 
composition of Sky Island landscapes cannot be understated and indeed, fire is the 
one of the essential ecological process in almost all of the ecosystems of the 
borderlands region in southeastern Arizona (Swetnam, Baisan, & Kaib, 2001).   
 At some sites in the Chiricahua Mountains, the largest range in the Sky 
Islands, tree ring analysis has revealed that fire occurred on average once every 
three to five years (Seklecki, Grissino-Mayer, & Swetnam, 1996). This high fire 
frequency is linked to the region’s prevailing climatic patterns, especially the 
summer monsoon season.  These rains bring intense, highly localized 
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thunderstorms to the region with a high incidence of lightning (Gosz et al., 1995).  
Arizona and New Mexico have the highest density of reported lightning fires in 
the western states (Pyne, 2010, p. 3). These lightning storms arrive at the end of 
the spring and early summer dry season when the land is particularly susceptible 
to fire. Lightning ignites dozens of wildfires before the drenching monsoon rains 
suppress fire spread from late July through September. The early summer 
thunderstorms are predominantly responsible for the high fire frequencies 
recorded in tree rings (Baisan & Swetnam, 1990).  Tree ring analyses reveal a 
stark cessation in fire starting in the late 1800s, corresponding closely with the 
rise of widespread grazing in the region (Swetnam & Baisan, 1996).   
 The departure in fire regimes has occurred throughout the Sky Islands.  A 
coarse-scale analysis of fire regimes in the Sky Islands ecoregions indicates that 
up to 84 percent of forested lands within the study area exhibit moderately (class 
2) to severely altered (class 3) fire regimes (Marshall et al., 2004). With frequent, 
low-intensity fires no longer present to clear out underbrush and maintain open 
conditions in forest stands, a dense understory made up of brush and young trees 
(technically termed a“fuel load”) established throughout the Sky Island’s 
forests (Swetnam, Baisan, Caprio, & Brown, 1992).  Since the vegetation types in 
Arizona and northern Mexico’s Sky Islands are similar, scientists have a unique 
opportunity to study how different management practices affect fuel loadings and 
forest structure (Villarreal and Yool, 2008).  In a 2001 study of fuel loads in the 
U.S. Sky Islands compared to northeastern Sonora sky islands, researchers found 
that the sites north of the border contained far heavier amounts of downed woody 
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fuels (nonliving fuels on the forest floor) than those in Sonora.4 The sites in 
Sonora have not been subject to organized fire suppression and still exhibit high 
fire frequencies.  Some of the sites in the Chiricahua Mountains, which had not 
seen fire at the time of the study since 1900, had the highest amount of downed 
fuels (Escobedo et al., 2001).  Other comparison studies have found that tree 
densities in the Huachuca Mountains far exceed those in similar vegetative types 
in Mexico (Villareal & Yool, 2008). Fire suppression has led to increased tree 
density of various ages, creating a continuous source of fuels (oftentimes referred 
to as ladder fuels) (Villareal & Yool, 2008).  When fires do occur, this available 
fuel may allow fire to climb into canopies, resulting in crown fires that result in 
tree mortality.  Areas in the Sky Islands contain enough continuous fuels to carry 
high-severity fires into higher elevation conifer forests (Villareal & Yool, 2008). 
At a large enough scale, high severity burns destroy rather than maintain the 
structure, diversity, and integrity of forests.  Research has shown that following 
high-intensity crown fire in Madrean pine-oak communities, the establishment of 
oak seedlings far out-competes those of pine seedlings (Barton, 2002). Studies 
like these demonstrate that intense crown fires may convert mixed pine-oak 
forests into homogenous oak woodlands, with consequences for forest diversity 
(Barton, 2002).  
 In 1994, the lightning-caused Rattlesnake fire in the Chiricahuas burned 
27,500 acres and incurred just over six million dollars in suppression costs and 
                                                
4 Fuel loads is a term that describes the oven-dry weights of fuels per unit area.  Since fuel loads 
are correlated to potential energy that may be released from a fire, higher fuel loadings produce 
higher intensity fires (Escobedo et al., 2001).  
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five hundred thousand dollars in rehabilitation costs (Erickson, 1994).  At the 
time, it was the largest fire in the Chiricahua Mountains in 77 years and both its 
size and severity were considered to be historically and ecologically atypical 
(Erickson, 1994; Swetnam, Baisan, & Kaib 2001). Larger and more severe fires 
would follow however. Severity refers to the degree of injury or mortality 
resulting from a wildfire (Keeley et al., 2009).  High-severity burns from the 
Rattlesnake fire left portions of the Chiricahuas completely devoid of any 
vegetation (Erickson, 1994). High severity fire of this kind can incinerate 
everything above and below ground, from towering ponderosa pines to soil 
microorganisms. Heavy erosion from the monsoon rains following the fire 
removed topsoil and formed gullies, including a nine-meter deep arroyo that 
exposed sediments thousands of years old (Swetnam, Baisan, & Kaib 2001).  This 
arroyo is anomalous; there are none of similar size or at similar elevation in all of 
the Chiricahuas (Swetnam, Baisan, & Kaib 2001). The long-term impacts of high 
severity burns may take centuries or perhaps even millennia to repair; the steep 
slopes where crown fires removed entire stands may never look the same again 
(Erickson, 1994; Swetnam, Baisan, & Kaib 2001). According to Don Falk, one of 
the region’s most accomplished fire ecologists, “the real issue with the fires of the 
last decade is that their behavior and effects exceed the current state of 
understanding in fire science and ecology.”  Figures 1 and 2 show the effects of a 
patch of high severity burn from the Horseshoe II fire of 2011.  The images below 
are before and after pictures taken by the National Park Service's Sonoran Desert 
Inventory and Monitoring Network in Jesse James Canyon, located within 
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Chiricahua National Monument.  As the pictures reveal, this portion of the fire 
resulting in severe damage to standing vegetation and soils.  
 
Figure 1: Jesse James Canyon, before the Horseshoe II fire. 
 
Figure 2: Jesse James Canyon, after the Horseshoe II fire. 
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 Climate change is projected to bring warmer and drier conditions to the 
southwest (Brown, Hall, & Westerling, 2004; Fule, 2008).  The average annual 
temperature in the southwest has risen 1.5 degrees Fahrenheit since 1950 and 
some models predict an increase in 2-5 degrees by 2030 and as much as 4-10 
degrees by 2090 (Robles & Enquist, 2010).  There is a broad consensus amongst 
the various models used to make these predictions that a transition to a 
significantly more arid climate is likely for the remainder of the 21st century 
(Seager et al., 2007).  Climate change models also predict extended drought, 
decreased snowpack, earlier snowmelt, and decreases in soil moisture (Cayan et 
al., 2010). The effects of climate change on forested ecosystems ranges from 
impacts on species distribution and on disturbance regimes, which together will 
affect ecosystem structure, composition, and function (Keeton, Mote, & Franklin, 
2007).  Studies have linked large wildfire events to increases in spring and 
summer temperature and earlier timing of spring runoff (Westerling et al., 2006).  
Furthermore, the effects of drought are linked to wildfire and bark beetle induced 
mortality in southwestern forests; in the last few decades, bark beetle outbreaks 
and high-severity wildfire have resulted in forest mortality of 18% of 
Southwestern forests in Arizona and New Mexico (Williams et al., 2010).   By 
increasing the length of the fire season, warmer and drier climate is also likely to 
result in a marked increase in the size and severity of wildfires in the southwest 
(Brown, Hall, & Westerling, 2004).  The overwhelming consensus is that climate 
change has profound implications for the future integrity and sustainability of 
southwestern forests (Robles & Enquist, 2010).  
 
28 
 An understanding of the past is critical to understanding to what degree 
the Sky Islands have changed over time and why human intervention is needed.  It 
is clear from an ecological perspective, that restoration treatments are necessary to 
reduce the amount of hazardous fuels, restore a more natural forest structure, and 
protect the Sky Island’s diverse ecosystems from the risk of more severe wildfire. 
However, contemporary efforts to accomplish these goals work within an 
increasingly complex socio-economic context.  More recent changes in the land 
use and land management priorities in the region continue to influence how fire 
operates on the landscape, and perhaps more importantly, whether or not fire can 
be allowed to resume its place.  This chapter will conclude with a discussion on 
the more recent changes in land use and the broader socioeconomic context in 
which fire management takes place.  I will identify several important trends and 
discuss how these changes influence fire management and restoration.  
Contemporary Influences on Fire Restoration 
 Fire is a landscape level process and from a management perspective, how 
a landscape is administered and used may complicate or facilitate fire 
management, and especially, fire reintroduction. Land ownership patterns both 
within and bordering Sky Island ranges are made up of a mixture of federal, tribal, 
private, and state lands, creating a complex mosaic of different federal and state 
jurisdictions (USFS, 2008).  The Forest Service oversees the upper elevation 
ranges, while the intervening valleys are made up of a mix if Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM), Arizona State Trust Lands, Tribal, and private lands. There 
are also military lands, U.S. Fish and Wildlife special areas, and a national 
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monument administered by the National Park Service.  This administrative 
partitioning has created a patchwork of different jurisdictions and ownerships 
throughout the region.  A consequence of this land ownership pattern is that land 
ownership usually does not coincide with ecological boundaries.  According to 
Sayre (2005), the patchwork type landownership patterns in the American 
Southwest create complex social and ecological natural resource management 
issues, especially related to conservation and fire restoration.  This is partially 
because the various land management agencies present in the region have 
different agency mandates and manage with different goals in mind.  The 
combination of federal and private ownership further complicates matters because 
it necessitates collaboration and cooperation to accomplish landscape-level 
restoration (Sayre, 2005, p. 789).  
 Land-ownership is growing more complex as the regions surrounding the 
Sky Islands are undergoing both rapid and sustained population growth in both 
rural and urban areas (USFS, 2008).  This increased human presence puts 
considerable pressure on forested lands.  Population growth and the associated 
increase in housing, especially rural homes and homes intended for seasonal use, 
will invariably increase the number of forest users and change the scale and scope 
of interactions between the forests and surrounding communities (University of 
Arizona, 2005). Population growth also influences the relationship between land 
managers and the public. Starting in the 1970s, the public has increasingly viewed 
the Coronado National forest as a “recreation” forest, creating more demand for 
recreational resources, and placing more pressure on the Forest Service to 
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acknowledge the increase in recreational use and devote more resources to 
managing recreational impacts (Russell & Adams-Russell, 2005). 
 Population growth is coupled with rising rates of exurbanization, defined 
as low-density development in rural areas.  Many are attracted to the stunning 
landscapes and biodiversity of the Sky Islands but there are also institutional 
factors at play in the rise of exurbanization. Zoning designations through city and 
county level planning have increased the cost of residential development within 
city limits, which has inadvertently promoted low-density, exurban development 
in areas where there are fewer regulations (Esparza & Carruthers, 2000).  
Between 1980 and 1996, population grew by 42% in unincorporated areas in 
Cochise County (Esparza & Carruthers, 2000, p. 27).   This is not isolated to the 
Sky Islands; exurban development is one of the fastest growing forms of land use 
in the Western United States (Hansen et al., 2005). Those seeking solitude in the 
Sky Islands have settled on property from old homesteads, ranches, mining 
claims, and railroad land grants. Some of these parcels of private land are within 
or directly adjacent to forest boundaries (York & Schoon, 2011). Because most 
people fear fire and dislike smoke, there is public resistance to wildfire and strong 
support for fire suppression. The rise of homes and structures within fire-
dependent ecosystems is consistently cited in fire management circles as a barrier 
to effective fire management. Oftentimes referred to as the urban-wildland 
interface, homes within and proximate to wildland areas redirect fire management 
efforts to fire suppression and prevention. The Forest Service in a recent report on 
the social and economic sustainability in the Coronado National Forest 
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acknowledges that increasing development will restrict the ability of land 
managers to employ ecosystem management strategies and manage fire on 
landscape scales (USFS, 2008).  The report also acknowledged “development of 
any kind severely restricts the ability of the Forest Service to use fire for 
ecosystem restoration purposes” (USDAFS, 2008, p. 33).  This has led some fire 
ecologists to posit, “We do not have a fire problem so much as we have a land use 
problem (Falk, presentation to Southwest Fire Ecology Conference, 2012).”  
 Due to their proximity to the U.S./Mexico Border, the Sky Islands are 
subject to the tensions and impacts surrounding illegal immigration and border 
activities. Illegal immigration has become a highly contentious issue in the region 
(Morehouse et al., 2008).  There has been a dramatic increase in migrant traffic 
and drug smuggling in the Coronado National Forest since 1994, which has 
resulted in significant environmental impacts, such as trash and human waste 
accumulation and erosion in high traffic areas (Coronado Planning Partnership, 
2008). Illegal immigration and especially drug trafficking have resulted in safety 
concerns for users and management personnel and heightened political tensions 
(USDAFS, 2009a).  A 2011 report by the Government Accountability Office 
estimated that between 2006 and 2010, human activity of all types caused 87% of 
the 2,647 fires that occurred in the Arizona border region.  Roughly 16% of these 
fires (422 fires) occurred on national forest lands, and evidence indicates that 
illegal border crossers may have been responsible for 30 of these fires (GAO, 
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2011).5  Following the 2011 fire season, U.S. Senator John McCain suggested that 
illegal immigrants were behind the state’s devastating fire season in an attempt to 
secure more support for stronger border protections (Mandell, 2011) even though 
investigations were still underway (Vilensky, 2011).  This resulted in media 
criticism and questions of the legitimacy of his claims (Vilensky, 2011).  
Regardless of the cause of recent fires, this issue exemplifies how political actors 
use fire to fuel debates over management practices and unrelated policies, such as 
illegal immigration in this case.  The next chapter will discuss more examples of 
how fire has served as a surrogate issue behind much larger debates over forest 
management and decision-making processes.  Illegal immigration and drug 
trafficking have heightened tensions in the borderlands region and may 
complicate restoration efforts, especially since the risk of more man-made fires 
may damage areas before land managers can carry out fuel reduction treatments.  
The Forest Service in addition to managing the Sky Island forests for recreation, 
grazing, mining, watershed, and wildlife habitat must also come to terms with the 
impact illegal immigration and drug smuggling have on fire risk and safety.  In 
addition, the issue of illegal immigration also raises questions of priorities in the 
region.  There is a tension between the need to protect sensitive biological 
resources and the need to secure the border, with arguments on both sides for 
which is more urgent.   
 
 
                                                
5 The Government Accountability Office (known previously as the General Accounting Office) is 
an independent agency that provides investigative reports of federal activities.  
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Conclusion 
 The Sky Islands have always been in flux and will continue to change in 
the future.  An understanding of the past provides a clearer picture of what may be 
required in the present to maintain the Sky Island’s biological diversity and 
ecological integrity. From an ecological perspective, it is evident that restoration 
treatments are necessary to reduce hazardous fuels, restore a more open forest 
structure, and protect the Sky Island’s diverse ecosystems from the risk of more 
severe wildfire.  Yet, recognizing that fire needs to reassert its role on 
southwestern landscapes does not make reintroducing fire a simple task.  
Contemporary efforts must also adapt to the socio-economic context of the 21st 
century.  More recent changes in land use continue to influence how fire operates 
on the landscape, and perhaps more importantly, whether or not fire can be 
restored.  There are social and ecological factors that complicate restoration 
efforts and raise questions on its feasibility.  It may not be feasible to treat Sky 
Island landscapes on a large enough scale to change fire behavior and it may not 
be socially acceptable to do so.  
 Fire management in the Sky Islands today takes places in a complex social 
and ecological context.  Pressure from population growth and development will 
make it more difficult for land management agencies to effectively mange and 
reintroduce fire.  In addition, these various land management agencies must 
manage the Sky Islands for multiple, and sometimes, conflicting goals.  The 
diverse public and private interests in the region have different expectations and 
hopes for how these landscapes are managed.  There are more voices, more values 
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at play, and more severe threats to the ecological integrity of the region than ever 
before.  The legacies of past management and the human boundaries staked out 
across the landscape have made it harder to manage landscape-scale ecological 
processes like fire.  The social and ecological character of the Sky Islands has 
undergone significant change in the last century and the processes currently 
underway, such as climate change, population growth, and exurban development, 
will continue to shape the biophysical character of the forested ranges and arid 
valleys of the region.  Local and regional processes are not the only factors that 
have influenced ecological change in the Sky Islands; in the context of fire 
management especially, suppression policies created and promoted at the federal 
level, which I discuss in the next chapter, are also a key part of the wildland fire 
issue in the Western U.S.  
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Chapter 3 
WILDLAND FIRE: THE NATIONAL SCENE 
Introduction 
 Federal wildland policy has evolved considerably since the formation of 
the Forest Service over 100 years ago.  This evolution reflects advancements in 
the field of fire ecology, changes in public sentiment towards land management, 
and substantive reshaping of environmental policy.  It is important to consider this 
rich history because more recent, collaborative approaches to fire restoration are 
shaped by this past and are in many ways, a response to it.  These approaches 
have an interesting story to tell.  In many instances, they arise in local contexts 
where the combination of shared interest and leadership leads to efforts with 
many partners to research and implement new approaches to fire restoration.  
However, these collaborative approaches are also paralleled by an equally 
interesting evolution in wildland fire policy.  This evolution has produced policies 
of complete suppression, where fire was aggressively extinguished, and more 
recently, policies of appropriate response, reintroduction, and restoration, where 
fire has been rebranded as a critical ecological process, essential for the 
restoration of certain ecosystems. 
 Many of the formal policies and guiding principles of land management 
agencies like the Forest Service have elevated the need for restoration in western 
forests over the years.  This has been accompanied by support from state 
lawmakers, interest groups, and scientists for restoration.  Yet, in practice, 
restoration is a complex task.  There is disagreement over how to achieve 
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“healthier,” less-fire prone forests.  There have even been highly visible mistakes, 
such as damaging and expensive escaped prescribed fires, set to reduce fuels and 
restore more natural conditions.  Despite the setbacks and controversies, there has 
been a steady advancement in formal policies and declarations for restoration 
accomplished through collaborative means.  FireScape embodies the types of 
approaches and collaboration that policy makers, scientists, and academics have 
been suggesting for fire management for decades. To fully appreciate these new 
directions requires an understanding of its origins.  A discussion of the modern 
era of forest management, with special attention to how land mangers, scientists, 
politicians, and the public have influenced forest and fire management, will 
follow. 
New Policies and Participation 
 As the previous section introduced, the Forest Service, and other land 
management agencies, exclusively supported a policy of fire exclusion starting 
early in the twentieth century and continuing through the 1960s (Williams, 2000).  
Starting in the 1960s, a series of events eventually placed these suppression 
policies under more intense public, congressional, and scientific scrutiny.  The 
changes that followed constituted a sea change, because for the first time in 
organized forest management, federal agencies formally acknowledged that not 
all fire is “bad” (Pyne, 1982).  There were several forces at work that initiated and 
propelled this revolution, including a new suite of environmental laws, the growth 
of fire ecology, and large fire events that made it hard to ignore the consequences 
of suppression. 
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 Concern for the environment began to coalesce in the 1960s and 1970s, 
which led the American public to weigh in more heavily on natural resource 
management and especially, on forest planning (Pyne, 2010, p. 46).  The public, 
and an increasing number of citizen groups, pressured the Forest Service to place 
more focus on wildlife habitat, wilderness protection, and recreational 
opportunities over commodity-oriented forestry. New laws provided the legal 
backing to these sentiments. Policies such as the Wilderness Act of 1964 “gave 
enthusiasm for wilderness a statutory reality” and provided a means to designated 
important ecological areas with congressional protection (Pyne, 2010, p. 46). The 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 mandated environmental 
review of federal actions by requiring federal agencies to carefully analyze 
environmental impacts and to propose alternative courses of action (Hays, 2007, 
p. 6-7).  NEPA also created procedural requirements such as public scoping and 
review that allowed citizens and scientists the opportunity to voice concerns and 
“bring the latest ecological forest science to bear on forest plans” (Hays, 2007, p. 
7). 
 The next big evolution in forest management came with the passage of the 
National Forest Management Act (NFMA) of 1976.  This act required the Forest 
Service to create comprehensive, forest wide planning processes that took the 
form of 15-year plans (Hays, 2007, p. 16).  Like NEPA, the Forest Service would 
propose a set of plan alternatives that would be made available for public review 
(Hays, 2007, p.17). Both NEPA and NFMA provided the public with a statutory 
avenue to voice concerns in forest planning.  By the 1970s, newly forming citizen 
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groups called for reforms in forest planning and management that focused on 
ecological integrity, providing options for recreation, and more holistic 
management (Hays, 2007, p. 45-46).  Public involvement in forest planning in the 
1980s and 1990s influenced the Forest Service to put greater stock into ecological 
forestry over commodity forestry (Hays, 2007, p. 82).  These new environmental 
laws and planning policies redefined the relationships between agencies and the 
public and between the agencies and the landscapes under their charge. 
 Scientific research conducted outside of the Forest Service raised 
questions about the legitimacy of fire suppression.  Scientists began to provide 
evidence that “fire's exclusion could be as disruptive as its application” (Pyne, 
2010, p. 47).  This evidence appeared as warnings of the deleterious effects of fire 
suppression on forested ecosystems (Keeley et al., 2009, p. 3).  A deepening 
understanding of fire ecology mirrored a deepening understanding of the 
complexity of ecological systems. According to Samuel P. Hayes who wrote an 
extensive account of the rise of ecological forestry in America, “the citizen 
movement for ecological reform and biological scientists with new ecological 
interests tended to work in tandem.  To the public, the reformers were the more 
visible of the two, but in terms of the timing and historical development it appears 
that often the scientists led the way and the reformers followed the course they 
had charted” (Hayes, 2007, p. 53). 
Redefining Fire 
 With more voices to weigh in on fire management and more evidence of 
the ecological consequences of fire suppression, federal agencies began retreating 
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from their policies of aggressive fire suppression. The National Park Service was 
the first agency to reform its wildland fire guidelines (Pyne, 2010, p. 49).  In 1968 
it replaced the 10 a.m. policy with one that encouraged fire, both natural and 
prescribed.  The Forest Service was slower to respond, but by 1972 it, too, 
modified their policy and officially abolished the 10 a.m. policy in 1978 (Pyne, 
2010, p. 50).  This policy marked a turning point in the agency’s relationship with 
fire as it not only reinterpreted fire as an integral component of ecological 
integrity, but it provided the Forest Service with more flexibility in how it 
managed fire.  The agency allowed forest managers to conduct prescribed natural 
fires, permitting the Forest Service to allow naturally caused fires to burn in 
designated areas under designated conditions (Arno & Fielder, 2005).  Also in 
1978, Congress repealed the “blank check” law, opting instead to appropriate 
suppression funds annually (O’Toole, 2002). The decades to come saw continued 
policy change as the Forest Service experimented with these new policies, and it 
become clear that, “putting fire back onto the land was different than taking it out, 
and far trickier.  It was not enough to stop suppressing fire, or to light instead of 
fight” (Pyne, 2010, p. 51).  Large wildland fire events complicated this new 
message of fire restoration and instigated new policy responses.  Fires like the 
fatal South Canyon fire in Colorado is a prime example.  The fire caused the death 
of fourteen firefighters and shocked the fire community (Pyne, 2010, p. 53). The 
South Canyon fire was but one fire in a season that took 34 lives and required 
over a billion dollars in suppression costs, the most expensive at that time (Pyne, 
2010, p. 53). 
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 In response to the 1994 season, the Departments of Interior and 
Agriculture created an interagency steering group to investigate the South Canyon 
Fire and to develop an interagency wildland fire policy. A series of hearings held 
by the Forest Service and Congress indicated that administrators within the 
agencies understood the need for programmatic changes (Davis, 2006, p. 122).  
The steering group produced The Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy and 
Program Review in 1995, supplanting any existing fire policy. This was the first 
comprehensive, interagency federal wildland policy (Wise & Freitag, 2002).  The 
policy recognized that fire had become increasingly complex and posed an 
enormous threat to ecosystems and to communities throughout the United States 
(USDI & USDA, 1995). It called for large-scale assessments of existing fuel 
conditions, Fire Management Plans for all land management units with burnable 
vegetation,6 greater focus on scientific research to improve understanding of the 
relationship between wildland fire and ecosystem dynamics, and as a top priority, 
firefighter safety so to ensure that events like South Canyon would not be 
repeated (USDI & USDA, 1995). Because the policy called for implementation 
on a landscape level, it also emphasized greater interagency coordination and 
collaboration (USDI & USDA, 1995). The policy affirmed the role of fire in 
ecosystems and allowed agencies to use prescribed fire and to decide whether a 
fire could be allowed to burn for desired resource benefits (National Academy of 
                                                
6 Fire Management Plans guide the full range of fire-management activities for a given 
administrative unit, such as describing the range of appropriate response to fire. They also 
typically address resource management objectives such as restoration and rehabilitation for pre 
and post fire management.  These plans are presented as a means to reduce hazards, increase 
suppression efficiency, and decrease suppression costs (USDAFS, 2001). 
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Public Administration [NAPA], 2001).  This expanded role was a dramatic shift 
in how land management agencies managed fire.  Now, wildfire managers had 
two missions: reduce fire hazards while improving ecosystem health (NAPA, 
2001). Perhaps more significantly, it officially “ended the last echoes of the old 
suppression mandate” (Pyne, 2010, p. 83). In practice, the policy led to an 
increase in resources and funding for fuel reduction, prescribed fires, and invasive 
plant control (Davis, 2006, p. 122).  The Forest Service also committed to 
increasing the number of acres treated for hazardous fuel reduction (Davis, 2006). 
Persistent Challenges 
 Despite this new direction in wildland fire policy, agencies continued to 
struggle to meet the demands for more fuels treatments while simultaneously 
carrying out continued suppression (Davis, 2004, p. 1216).  One of the objectives 
of the 1995 policy was to reduce hazardous fuels annually on 1.2 million hectares 
of land, but the plan did not provide meaningful pathways for fuel reduction 
(Stephens and Ruth, 2005).  Natural resource policy specialists attributed the lack 
of progress to difficulties in preparing Fire Management Plans to guide fuels 
reduction, constraints on smoke production, concerns over impacts on threatened 
and endangered species, and budgetary limitations that delayed or prevented 
projects (Stephens and Ruth, 2005).  Other constraints to the use of prescribed 
burns to reduce fuels were the risks of an escaped fire and the effects one would 
have on professional reputations (Williams, 2000).  According to Stephen Pyne, 
“to conduct controlled fire on a suppression model is, in the end, to share its costs, 
risks, dangers, and difficulties” (Pyne, 2000, p. 5).  Surveys of fire officers in the 
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Forest Service show that some of the top barriers to using prescribed fire or 
allowing fires to burn to meet resource objectives include fears that the fires may 
threaten homes or resources just beyond planned fire boundaries and fears that 
fire behavior may be outside the range of what is desired (Black, Williams, & 
Doane, 2008).  Other surveys reveal that fire officers see inherent who are 
skeptical about the value of wildland fire use it less often than those who see more 
value in it (Williamson, 2006). Furthermore, there have been high-profile failures, 
such as the Cerro Grande fire, that highlight the inherent risks involved in 
intentionally setting fires (Paxon, 2000). 
 A 1999 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
highlighted the lack of progress on fuel reduction and recommended that the 
Forest Service create a comprehensive strategy to carry out this much needed 
work (Davis, 2004, p. 1216; GAO, 1999). The report found that fuels reduction 
projects are difficult to reconcile with other management goals such as clean air 
and clean water standards and that a tension exists between using the Forest 
Service’s timber sales management program to meet hazardous fuel reduction 
goals.  Hazardous fuels projects often focus on small-diameter trees and brush, 
while timber contracts focus on larger diameter, commercially valuable trees that 
are more fire resistant.  The GAO report found that timber management contracts 
combined with fuels reduction projects tend to focus on areas with higher value 
timber over areas in critical need of reduction work.  This report warned that 
nearly 39 million acres were at risk of catastrophic wildfire, threatening their 
ecological integrity and sustainability (GAO, 1999, p. 27-32). 
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 The GAO analysis turned out to be timely.  The following year, a 
particularly large and expensive wildfire season strained the fire establishment.  
One of the most high profile fires was the Cerro Grande, a 48,000-acre escaped 
prescribed fire that destroyed 250 structures, forced the evacuation of 18,000 
people, and threatened Los Alamos National Laboratory.  The National Park 
Service ignited the fire to reduce vegetation on 900 acres, but high winds carried 
the fire outside of its boundary.  In the wake of Cerro Grande, Secretary of the 
Interior Bruce Babbitt directed an interagency team to investigate the fire (Paxon, 
2000).  This investigative report, carried out by the National Interagency Fire 
Center, found that the Park Service had not adequately planned and prepared for 
the prescribed fire (NIFC, 2000).  A GAO report released shortly after reached the 
same conclusions and suggested that weaknesses in the Park Service’s operational 
procedures, such as a failure to evaluate fuel conditions and potential fire 
behavior outside of the prescribed burn boundary, led to the escaped fire (GAO, 
2000). 
Costs 
 Adequate funding is one of the most persistent and prohibitive barriers to 
forest restoration. One of the challenges to securing the money needed to carry 
out restoration work is that an incredible amount of money and resources are 
dedicated to suppression.  Through the 1970s, suppression costs averaged 
between 60 and 120 million dollars a year and congressional funding 
authorizations were enough to cover these annual costs (O’Toole, 2006).  As acres 
burned and costs began to rise in the late 80s, Congress tripled the Forest 
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Service’s appropriation to an average of 300 million (Ingalsbee, 2004).  This 
proved to still not be enough and since the 1990s, the Forest Service has exceeded 
its suppression budget nearly every year (GAO, 2004).  Starting in 2000, nearly 
100 years after the beginning of the Forest Service, suppression costs averaged 
over one billion dollars annually, significantly straining the agency’s ability to 
fund other activities.  In addition, these costly years force the Forest Service to 
transfer funds intended for management, research, fuel treatments, or restoration 
to emergency suppression (GAO, 2004).  For example, between 1999 and 2003 
the Forest Service and Department of Interior transferred 2.7 billion dollars from 
numerous programs to fund wildfire suppression (GAO, 2004).  Though Congress 
typically reimburses the agencies for the cost of most of these budget transfers, 
the Forest Service covers 70 percent of suppression costs.  In effect, funding for 
suppression has accounted for more and more of the total Forest Service budget 
each year (Western Forestry Leadership Coalition, 2010).  In more recent years, 
firefighting consumes almost half of the Forest Service’s annual budget 
(Ingalsbee, 2004). 
 The rising costs of fire suppression strains the ability of the Forest Service 
to carry out much needed fuel reduction, fire rehabilitation, and forest restoration 
(Western Forestry Leadership Coalition, 2010).  Although spending on fuel 
reduction has slowly increased since 2001, fire preparedness and suppression 
spending far outweighs fuel reduction (Gorte, 2010).  Although suppression 
receives a majority of the funding, these other activities may help lower 
suppression costs in the long term.  A 2006 study on hazardous fuel reduction for 
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southwestern forests found that fuel reduction spending would lower future fire 
suppression costs (Snider et al., 2006).  Suppression costs are closely but not 
purely a result of the number of acres burned (Ingalsbee, 2004).  One of the most 
significant trends affecting wildland fire management and associated costs is 
development in the wildland-urban interface (Ingalsbee, 2004).  Homes in fire-
prone areas redirect suppression activities and increase the cost per acre of 
fighting fires (Berry, Donovan & Hesseln, 2006).  In addition, the presence of 
homes and other structures prevents federal agencies from allowing fires to burn, 
thereby committing them to expensive suppression activities (USDA, 2006). 
Others attribute the rising costs to “unquestioned” fiscal support for suppression 
from Congress (Ingalsbee, 2004). 
The National Fire Plan 
 The aftermath of the Cerro Grande fire and other fires in the 2000 season 
opened up a policy window, which President Clinton used to call on the 
Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture, Bruce Babbitt and Dan Glickman, to 
respond with recommendations for how best to manage fire impacts and reduce 
future fire risk to ecosystems and communities (Glickman & Babbitt, 2000).  
Their report made recommendations for President Clinton’s 2001 budget request 
to Congress and set the stage for a review of the 1995 federal policy (Kostishack 
& Rana, 2007).  Babbitt and Glickman created an interagency working group to 
review the existing 1995 wildfire policy and provide recommendations to the 
secretaries that would support the implementation of new policy.  The report, 
entitled “Review and Update of the 1995 Federal Wildland Fire Management 
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Policy” concluded that the principles in the 1995 policy were generally 
appropriate but some issues needed more emphasis and more specific 
implementation actions (USDI et al., 2001).  The report requested greater support 
and implementation of science on ecological restoration, not found in the 1995 
policy, and acknowledged that land management agencies still lacked the capacity 
for collaborative, multi-party, fire-related ecosystem management.  It supported 
the need for rehabilitation and restoration, science, fire management and 
ecosystem sustainability, communication and education, and better evaluation. 
These recommendations also expanded the scope of wildfire management. Now, 
“fire management activities will be used to help achieve ecosystem sustainability, 
including its interrelated ecological, economic, and social components” (USDI et 
al., p. 22).  The Glickman/Babbit report, the 2001 review and update, and a set of 
corresponding agency strategies to implement the 2001 review collectively 
became known as the National Fire Plan (NFP) (Kostishack & Rana, 2002). 
 Congress responded positively to President Clinton’s budget request and 
expressed its support of the National Fire Plan by appropriating financial 
resources to the Departments of Agriculture and Interior in their 2001 
appropriations bill. In 2001, Congress increased funding for hazardous forest fuel 
reduction, from $108 million to $401 million.  Out of all the federal agencies, the 
Forest Service received the largest portion of these funds (Kostishack & Rana, 
2002).  As part of the 2001 appropriations, Congress directed the Secretaries to 
work with state Governors and other stakeholders to develop a strategy to support 
the goals of the National Fire Plan at the state level (Steelman & Burke, 2011, p. 
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68).  To implement the NFP, both the Departments of Interior and Forest Service 
developed implementation teams to integrate the NFP into agency programs 
(Kostishack & Rana, 2002).  Fearing criticism that the agencies lacked centralized 
coordination and leadership to implement the NFP, the Secretaries of Agriculture 
and Interior established the Wildland Fire Leadership Council to oversee the 
implementation of the NFP (Kostishack & Rana, 2002). The Secretaries also 
established the Wildland Fire Leadership Executive Council to serve in an 
advisory capacity over the Leadership Council.  Both councils seek to enhance the 
integration of fire policy across many levels.7  Despite these policies, 
implementing all objectives of the National Fire Plan, as with the 1995 policy, 
again proved difficult.  A 2003 report to Congress acknowledged that despite 
commitments to protecting high-risk communities in the urban wildland interface, 
the Forest Service had not taken steps to identify high-risk communities, 
inventory lands for fuel reduction projects, or produce reports that described what 
would be accomplished with appropriated funds (GAO, 2003a). 
Healthy Forests 
 In policy at least, the Forest Service continued to reinforce its commitment 
to more flexible fire management.  Since 1995, fire policy continued to be 
modified to recognize and embrace fire as an essential ecological process and to 
support greater levels of fuels reduction and restoration projects, but strategies for 
how to carry out such goals are ever evolving (Stephens and Ruth, 2005). 
Although the National Fire Plan expressed a renewed pledged to increase 
                                                
7 For information on the role, membership, and agendas of the WFLC and the WFEC, visit: 
http://www.forestsandrangelands.gov/. 
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hazardous fuel reduction, acres treated on the ground lagged behind what was 
needed.  Furthermore, though the Forest Service reported acres treated annually it 
had not clarified whether or not these acres treated actually reduced hazardous 
fuels and wildland fire risk.  A 2003 GAO report  found that agencies involved in 
fuel reduction have not adequately reported baseline conditions or implemented 
monitoring protocols to assess the effectiveness of treatments, leading the GAO to 
conclude, it is and likely will continue to be difficult to assess the progress being 
made under the fuels reduction program in terms of reducing the overall risk of 
wildfires nationwide” (GAO, 2003a, p. 5).  The same way that the South Fork 
and Cerro Grande fires recalibrated fire policy, severe wildfires in 2002 and 2003 
again refocused attention on wildland fire and led to a new framing of the 
problem.  These fires prompted the Bush administration and members of 
Congress to pursue a reform of the appeals process, which they viewed as a 
roadblock to hazardous fuel reductions in the National Forests (Vaughn, 2003). 
 This new direction was partly based on a Forest Service report entitled 
Factors Affecting Timely Mechanical Forest Treatment Decisions (USDAFS, 
2002a).  The GAO also analyzed appeals on Forest Service fuels reduction 
projects in a 2003 report (GAO, 2003b).  Both of these reports, released within a 
year of each other, were based on data between 2001 and 2002, but reached 
different conclusions.  The Forest Service report found that out of 326 appealable 
mechanical treatments it sampled, 48% were appealed and 6% were litigated 
(USDAFS, 2002a).  Based on these statistics, it concluded that the appeals 
process requires a significant amount of time and resources.  In contrast, the GAO 
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report provided a more complete explanation of the appeals.  Although the Forest 
Service mentioned that it was only addressing the fuels reduction projects that 
were technically appealable, the GAO report acknowledged that the 457 projects 
not appealable covered roughly 3 million acres.8  Out of the remaining 1.7 million 
acres of national forest land covered by projects subject to appeal, appealed 
projects affected 900,000 acres, or 20% of the total lands being considered for 
fuel reduction.  The GAO report did find that 59% of the projects on these lands 
were appealed, but research on the outcomes of these appeals revealed that 133 
required no change, 16 required minor modifications before implementation, 10 
were reversed, and 12 were withdrawn.  A majority of these appeals, 79%, were 
processed within the required 90-day time frame.  Litigated projects comprised an 
even smaller percentage.  Even though all projects can be litigated, only 23 were 
litigated, representing 3% of projects. Thus it would seem that although the 
appeals process may require agency resources and time, at least during the two 
years studied, the appeals process did not affect a majority of the land area and 
allowed 74% of all appealed projects to continue within agency timeframes.   The 
GAO report exposed the Forest Service’s failure to present an honest discussion 
of how appeals influence fuel reduction projects.  The conflicting reports and the 
Forest Service’s sampling biases led environmental groups and several 
Congressmen to question the validity and credibility of the Forest Service 
                                                
8 These decisions were Categorical Exclusions, a streamlined approval process reserved for 
management actions that will not have a “significant” effect on natural, historic, cultural, or 
recreational resources, thus, exempting them from public review and appeal prior to 
implementation (40 CFR 1508.4; 23 CFR 771.117(a)). Categorical Exclusions are still subject to 
litigation.   
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findings (Vaughn, 2003).  Others in Congress supported the Forest Service’s 
conclusions and continue to blame environmental groups using the appeals 
process as a significant cause of delay. 
 Despite the controversy, the Bush administration took advantage of the 
opportunity to reframe the issue and adopt new policy (Vaughn, 2003).  In 2002, 
President Bush unveiled the Healthy Forests Initiative (HFI), a proposal to 
increase hazardous fuels reduction by expediting the administrative process 
through streamlining public review and limiting administrative appeals (Stephens 
and Ruth, 2005).  These ideas were incorporated into law under the 2003 Healthy 
Forests Restoration Act (HFRA).  The act was predicated on the notion that 
lengthy environmental analysis and unrestrained administrative appeals were 
preventing hazardous fuel reduction and putting national forest lands at even more 
of a risk to catastrophic wildfire (Davis, 2004, p. 1218).  The act contained a 
number of provisions to hasten environmental review and hamper public 
participation.  It limited the number of alternatives required by NEPA analysis 
and it established a new “pre-decisional” administrative process.  Previously, the 
public was permitted to appeal a final decision within 45 days of notice of 
decision.  In the new process, the public may only comment before the agency 
issues its final decision.  Even more troubling to some, was that only those who 
participated in this pre-decisional process with specific comments could object to 
or litigate a decision later. One of the more controversial aspects of the act was 
that it encouraged forest planners to submit fuel reduction projects as categorical 
exclusions, which allowed projects to be approved without environmental impact 
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statements (Davis, 2004, p. 1225). 
 The act faced criticism from multiple fronts.  Some in the scientific 
community were concerned that the act was too narrowly focused on fuel 
reduction as opposed to broader restoration goals (Prather, Noss, & Sisk, 2008, p. 
141).  Environmental groups viewed the HFI and the HFRA as an attempt to 
allow commercial logging companies greater access to public forests while 
restricting public participation in forest decisions (Davis, 2004, p. 1243).  The 
Natural Resources Defense Council released the following press statement after 
President Bush announced the HFI, “protecting homes and communities should 
be the first priority of any national forest fire plan. Unfortunately, the plan 
unveiled today by President Bush is a smokescreen that misses the target in 
reducing this threat. Instead, the president's so-called "Healthy Forests" initiative 
exploits the fear of fires in order to gut environmental protections and boost 
commercial logging” (NRDC, 2002). Groups like the American Forest Resource 
Council (AFRC), representing timber and wood manufacturing interests, 
supported the act.  In testimony to Congress during hearings on the act’s 
implementation, the president of the AFRC provided the following statement 
during his remarks: 
For decades federal land managers have been struggling with 
how to manage the forests while complying with complicated 
National Environmental Policy Act regulations, a judicial 
process that favors intervention rather than project 
implementation, drought conditions that have taken their toll on 
the overcrowded forests, and analysis paralysis that favors 
planning over action. The result of these conflicting constraints 
and interests has put our nation's public and private forestlands 
in serious jeopardy to destruction by wildfire, insects, disease, 
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and blowdown. We believe that HFRA did a good job of 
identifying the current forest health problems and providing a 
vision on how to deal with the obstacles facing our forest 
managers (Partin, 2004, p. D694). 
 The debate surrounding the HFRA also highlighted several important 
questions regarding how to deal with forest fuels (Hays, 2007).  Where should 
scarce funds be allocated, along the urban wildland interface or in backcountry 
areas?  Should loggers be allowed to take large diameter (old growth) trees in 
addition to the small diameter trees that are the target for fuel reduction thinning?  
Should post-fire restoration allow “salvage” logging of large diameter trees killed 
by wildfire or should the soil be protected from disturbance during restoration and 
large trees left as “snags” for wildlife habitat?  These events demonstrate how 
policy makers have used fire policy as a way to pursue reforms for other proxy 
issues. According to Martin Nie, “the USFS has used fire controversies to fuel a 
larger debate over allegedly excessive environmental analysis required by various 
laws, and overly litigious environmental strategies” (2008, p. 18).  Instead of 
analyzing Forest Service management and policies for shortcomings, government 
policy makers framed the issue around the overreach of environmental groups 
(Vaughn, 2003). Despite the controversy, the HFI and HFRA renewed federal 
commitment to the restoration of national forests and the reduction of wildland 
fire risk.  It also revealed that the pathways to forest restoration can be rife with 
difficulties, due to disagreement over how to prioritize treatments, the extent to 
which the public should be involved, and the multiple interests at stake in the 
outcomes. 
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Recent Policies Attempts to Address Persistent Challenges 
 Shortly after President Obama took office in 2009, the administration and 
congress enacted a series of policies and funding mechanisms to promote 
proactive fire management and support collaborative forest restoration.  President 
Obama reformed fire-management funding by creating a pair of reserve funds for 
wildfire suppression in addition to fully funding existing wildfire programs.  
Designed to deal with both increases in emergency suppression costs and the 
common practice of borrowing from other funds to cover the cost of fire, the 
administration sought enactment of the Federal Land Assistance, Management, 
and Enhancement Act to create a more dedicated and predictable funding stream 
for wildfire suppression activities.  President Obama initially requested two $75 
million reserve funds (one for the Department of Interior and one for the 
Department of Agriculture), but congress dedicated 413 million to the Forest 
Service and 61 million for the DOI in fiscal year 2009 on top of their annual 
appropriation for wildfire suppression.  Known as the “FLAME Fund,” it 
establishes more money to fight fires and prevent suppression costs from affecting 
other areas of agency budgets and is the largest non-emergency funding increase 
for suppression ever provided.  The act also required the Secretaries of 
Agriculture and Interior to submit a report to congress with a cohesive strategy to 
address wildland fire. The WFLC is currently developing this strategy, known as 
the National Cohesive Wildland Fire Management Strategy.  The goal of this 
strategy is to restore and maintain resilient, fire adapted landscapes and 
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communities, yet another federal commitment to restoration on national forest and 
rangelands. 
 Also in 2009, the Wildland Fire Executive Council revised the response 
mechanisms to fire by creating the  “Guidance for Implementation of the Federal 
Wildland Fire Policy” (WFEC, 2009).  Authorized by the Obama administration, 
this policy is one of the most profound changes in fire management policy in the 
last 40 years (Ingalsbee, 2010).  This policy ended the bifurcation in wildland fire 
response between suppression and wildland fire use (Ingalsbee, 2010).  Now, “a 
wildland fire may be concurrently managed for one or more objectives and 
objectives can change as the fire spreads across the landscape” (WFEC, 2009, p. 
7).  For example, this allows fire managers to aggressively suppress fires on one 
front to protect communities, while allowing the fire on another front to burn in 
order to meet fuel reduction or restoration goals (Ingalsbee, 2010).  Thus, 
wildland fire response allows managers to manage a particular fire for multiple 
objectives with “economic rationality” and “ecological rationality” (Ingalsbee, 
2010, p. 33).  These recent policies address the need for stable funding to support 
suppression and restoration and to give land managers more flexibility to manage 
unplanned fires.  They are markedly different from the policies and practices first 
created and used to manage wildland fire.   In addition, they reflect the value that 
the public, scientists, and managers have placed on efforts that combine scientific 
research, multiple stakeholders, and proactive approaches to restoring forests.  
One of the more intriguing themes in recent policies is the emphasis on 
collaboration, which warrants further discussion. 
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Collaborative Wildland Fire Management 
 Natural resource management in the United States has undergone a 
measurable shift toward collaboration in the last thirty years (Wondolleck and 
Yaffee, 2000). Wildland fire management has also reflected this emphasis in a 
diversity of ways.  Congress, land managers, state and local governments, fire 
ecologists, and restoration practitioners have all supported collaborative policies 
and practices for several wildland fire objectives (Sturtevant and Jakes, 2008). 
These groups have supported collaboration in federal policy, policy resolutions, 
reports, and other recommendations.  The following section will first provide a 
brief discussion on the basic mechanisms of collaboration in wildfire management 
and follow with a discussion on the evolution of collaboration in these various 
types of policies, with an emphasis on the relationship between collaboration and 
landscape-level restoration. 
 Collaboration can generally be thought of as a process where different 
groups in a given context work together to accomplish a set of mutually defined 
goals (Sturtevant & Jakes, 2008).  In natural resource management, collaboration 
brings together multiple ownerships and interests to address issues that transcend 
typical boundaries.  Since human boundaries rarely align with ecological 
boundaries, collaboration is one way to plan and implement projects on broader 
scales.  Thus, collaboration in natural resource management often involves federal 
and state agencies, private landowners, and economic and environmental interest 
groups.  In the context of wildfire management, collaboration is promoted as: a 
mechanism to develop policies that enhance wildfire planning and response, a 
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means to increase the involvement of local communities in preparedness for 
wildfire, and of particular interest to this analysis, a necessary element in 
landscape-level fuel reduction and restoration projects.  In a 2009 technical report 
on collaborative wildfire management, the Forest Service identified collaboration 
as a process in which stakeholders foster the ability to build relationships and the 
capacity to work together, frame and address problems collectively, and build 
mutual trust. In this same report, the Forest Service characterized the wildland fire 
problem as a collective problem that requires the many stakeholders involved to 
“develop and implement collaborative, innovative solutions that take advantage of 
partnerships, shared resources, and expertise across landscapes” (USFS, 2009b, p. 
13). 
Early Beginnings and Specific Policy Direction 
 One of the first collaborative efforts in wildfire response occurred in 1965, 
when the Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management established a joint 
coordination center in Boise Idaho, known now as the National Interagency Fire 
Center (NIFC).  Today, the National Park Service, Bureau of Indian Affairs, US 
Fish and Wildlife Service, National Weather Service and other agencies 
coordinate and mobilize resources, such as crews and equipment, for wildland 
fires.  Policies recommended by interagency working groups consistently 
requested collaboration in wildland fire management.  In the 1995 federal 
wildland fire policy, collaboration was viewed as one of the keys to solving the 
complexities of wildland fire (USDI & USDA, 1995).  As one of the plan’s 
guiding principles, collaboration was presented as a means to forge a new 
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direction for fire management in the West.  Federal agencies, private landowners, 
and state, local, tribal and private entities were all included in the request for more 
collaborative fire planning, management, and action.  In the 2001 update of 
federal wildland fire policy, federal agencies acknowledged that the 
implementation of the 1995 policy was incomplete where it involved 
“collaboration, coordination, and integration across agency jurisdiction and across 
different disciplines” (USDI et al., 2001, p. i).  It also touted collaboration as 
essential in all aspects of fire management: “fire management planning, 
preparedness, prevention, suppression, fire use, restoration and rehabilitation, 
monitoring, research, and education will be conducted on an interagency basis 
with the involvement of cooperators and partners” (National Wildfire 
Coordinating Group, 2001, p. 24). 
 The most recent iteration of federal wildfire policy, the 2011 National 
Cohesive Wildland Management Strategy again emphasized collaboration as a 
mechanism to carry out landscape level projects, resolve differences in agency 
mandates and policies, and achieve cohesive decision making (Wildland Fire 
Leadership Council, 2011).  The 2011 policy elevated collaboration as a strategy 
even further: “taking a proactive, collaborative approach to solving the Nation’s 
wildfire problem and involving all stakeholders provides the best opportunity to 
restore and maintain landscapes, protect communities from wildfire and 
effectively respond to wildfires when they occur” (Wildland Fire Leadership 
Council, 2011, p. 12). Even though these high level policies strongly promote 
collaboration, they are less specific on how collaboration should be carried out in 
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practice.  Throughout the West, there are a growing number of landscape-level, 
collaborative efforts to carry out fuel reduction work, prescribed burns, and other 
treatments to restore more stable forest conditions in fire prone ecosystems.  
These projects, and the policies and recommendations supporting them, provide 
an opportunity to analyze how collaboration occurs on the ground. 
Landscape-level, Collaborative Efforts to Restore Forests 
 In recent years, a number of academic, practice-oriented, and professional 
management groups have promoted collaboration as a means to address fire and 
forest restoration planning.  The Western Forest Leadership Coalition asserts that 
collaboration provides a pathway for private forest owners to more fully engage in 
regional forest restoration projects.  In a 2010 report, the group acknowledged that 
collaboration between private owners and state and federal agencies can create 
new policy frameworks that give private landowners the ability to effectively 
partner with state and federal agencies in larger-scale efforts to carry out 
restoration projects (Western Forestry Leadership Coalition, 2010).  In addition, 
the report acknowledged that collaboration amongst landowners in “cross-
ownership” partnerships could also help achieve larger-scale impacts. 
 Recent policy resolutions by the Western Governors Association strongly 
support collaboration in landscape-level forest restoration.  A 2011 policy 
resolution acknowledged that a lack of “meaningful, ongoing collaboration that 
serves to accelerate the restoration practice” is hindering large-scale forest fuels 
and restoration projects (WGA, 2011, pp. 2).  This resolution was partly based on 
a 2011 report by The Western Governor’s Association’s Forest Health Advisory 
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Committee (FHAC).  The Forest Health Advisory Committee, made up of state 
foresters, environmental groups, scientists, and USDA and USDI administrators, 
made a strong case for collaborative, landscape level restoration: 
Creative approaches, grounded in high quality science and 
forged through a collaborative process, have been demonstrated 
in the Western states. These approaches are ready to go and can 
be incorporated into all phases of ambitious new efforts with 
relative ease and enormous payback, ranging from increasingly 
accurate predictions regarding landscape-scale treatments, to 
empowered stakeholders and expanded zones of agreement 
(FHAC, 2011, p. 3). 
 These recommendations reveal the growing currency of collaborative, 
landscape level restoration in the dialogue surrounding forest and fire restoration.  
Collaboration is increasingly seen as the pathway to achieve landscape-scale 
restoration and coincidentally collaborative, landscape-level restoration programs 
are on the rise in western states (WGA, 2011).  National forests throughout 
western states have responded to this push for coordinated, landscape-level 
efforts.  A recent and high profile project was initiated in northern Arizona’s 
expansive ponderosa pine forests in early 2011.  The Four Forests Restoration 
Initiative (known as “4FRI”) is a collaborative program to plan and implement 
restoration treatments across 2.4 million acres of ponderosa pine forest in four 
national forests in northern Arizona.  The goal is to reduce hazardous fuels to 
allow for the increased use of prescribed fire to meet restoration goals.  One of the 
central components of 4FRI is to partner with the forest products industry to 
utilize the forest products resulting from treatments to both support local 
economies and help cover the cost of treatments.  The Four Forests project is 
predated by other large-scale restoration projects, namely the Greater Flagstaff 
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Forests Partnership and the White Mountain Stewardship Projects.  In both of 
these restoration initiatives, multiple partners have come together to seek common 
ground on acceptable forms of treatments.  Since northern Arizona’s ponderosa 
pine ecosystem suffers from the overgrowth of small-diameter trees and increased 
fire risk, to achieve a more natural, open forest structure more resistant to fire 
requires extensive thinning, oftentimes followed by prescribed fire (Allen et al., 
2002). 
 Arno and Fiedler provide a discussion of the competing definitions of 
acceptable forest restoration in an overview of the Greater Flagstaff Forest 
Partnership’s work (2005, p. 81-83).  During the Greater Flagstaff Forest 
Partnership’s work to choose appropriate restoration goals, the project proposed 
three treatment alternatives, each favored by a different partner.  The Forest 
Service preferred maintaining stands with trees of different sizes and ages and 
allowing cutting of old growth trees where appropriate, the Ecological Restoration 
Institute at Northern Arizona University favored maintaining old growth trees and 
mimicking pre-settlement forest conditions, and the Southwest Forest Alliance (an 
environmental group) proposed maintaining all old growth trees and allowing no 
cutting of trees larger than 16 inches in diameter.  Despite the differences in 
thinning practices, most will agree that thinning to some degree is necessary.  
Large-scale projects may require entirely new industries to utilize small diameter 
trees (Arno and Fiedler, 2005). 
 In June of 2012, the Forest Service faced criticism from conservation 
groups, county officials, and other members from initiative partners for awarding 
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a contract to an out of state company to conduct 4FRI’s planned thinning 
treatments (Aleshire, 2012).  Arizona Forest Restoration Products, a partner in 
4FRI working to develop ways to utilize small diameter trees, was denied the 
contract to the surprise of others involved. Following the Forest Service’s 
decision, a statement by the Grand Canyon Trust, one of the founding partners in 
the initiative, revealed the disappointment caused by the Forest Service’s 
decision: 
4FRI’s success will depend on the contractor being incredibly 
responsive to and an integral part of the collaborative process. It 
will require an industry partner that ensures that exactly the right 
kind of work is done with a very high level of trust from 
stakeholders that this work is supporting restoration, and that the 
proverbial industry tail is not wagging the dog. For these and 
other reasons, we were shocked and, to be honest, extremely 
disappointed that the Forest Service did not choose Arizona 
Forest Restoration Products (AZFRP) (Aumack, 2012). 
 
If collaboration is going to be continually stressed in various outlets and 
at various levels, there should be complementary attention to the 
challenges, difficulties, and potential for disagreement.  The following 
chapter will provide an in-depth case study of FireScape and continue 
this discussion.  One of the greater challenges for any project of this 
nature is to adequately secure funds for research, planning, and 
implementation activities.  Several more recent laws provide this sort of 
support. 
Recent Law Provides More Commitment to Collaboration 
 More recent legislation provides greater flexibility in wildfire management 
and stronger commitments to forest restoration.  In 2004, The Southwest Forest 
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Health and Wildfire Prevention Act established funding for a unique program to 
support applied research at three, university-based restoration institutes in 
Colorado, Arizona, and New Mexico.  The act directed these institutes to pursue 
research on restoration-based, hazardous fuel reduction treatments in order to 
support the implementation of collaborative, landscape level restoration projects.  
These institutes develop and translate the best-available science for land managers 
and restoration practitioners.  Though the act authorized a 15 million dollar per 
year appropriation, the yearly appropriation has ranged between $400,000 and 
$2.56 million.  Despite limited funding, a five-year review of the program 
concluded “no other existing entity has the capacity to carry out landscape-scale 
forest restoration” (Meridian Institute et al., 2009, p. 2).  The institutes have 
published dozens of reports and white papers, held workshops for land managers, 
and been involved in large-scale, restoration projects.  This act has provided 
funding to the Ecological Restoration Institute (ERI) at Northern Arizona 
University, one of the key partners in the Four Forests Initiative.  The ERI 
provides valuable information on restoration treatment outcomes.  The type of 
research supported by the act helps inform the planning, implementation, and 
monitoring of treatments that is essential in landscape-level approaches. 
 Another act of Congress, known as the Collaborative Forest Landscape 
Restoration Program (CFLRP) included in the 2009 Omnibus Public Land 
Management Act, provides funding for collaborative, science-based projects that 
prioritize ecological restoration of fire-adapted ecosystems.  The program 
provides up to 4 million dollars in funding for projects that are landscape-level, 
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incorporate the best available science, aim to restore the structure and 
composition of forests through hazardous fuel reduction, and are developed and 
implemented through collaborative processes.  So far, the Forest Service has 
selected 20 projects (10 in 2010 and 10 in 2012) to receive funding.  In 2010, 
northern Arizona’s 4FRI was one of the projects selected for federal funding and 
received 2 million dollars in 2010 and 3.5 million dollars in 2011 to support 
biological surveys, weed treatments, and other activities to prepare treatment 
areas for thinning and burning.9 
 These recent policies have been accompanied by commitments to 
restoration and collaboration by forest administrators.  In a 2009 speech, 
Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack outlined his vision for an “all lands 
approach” in response to the health crisis in America’s national forests.  Secretary 
Vilsack discussed the major threats to America’s forests and reaffirmed the need 
for restoration to be a driving principle in forest policy.  He also noted that the 
scale and scope of the problems facing national forests require landscape-level 
thinking that takes an “all-lands” approach (USDAFS, 2011a).  Such approaches 
invariably will require collaboration amongst the various agencies and private 
landowners who also have a stake in this crisis.  The CFLRP is a complement to 
this vision as it enables the Forest Service to work across agency boundaries and 
develop partnerships to accelerate the scale of restoration treatments.  In a 2011 
special article for the Arizona Republic, Secretary Vilsack echoed these 
                                                
9 For more information on the Collaborative Forest Landscape Restoration Program, visit 
http://www.fs.fed.us/restoration/CFLR/2012selections.shtml.  This website contains all of the 
project proposals and selections, as well as eligibility criteria.   
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sentiments and noted that recent Forest Service efforts such as the CFLRP give 
the agency more ability to promote collaborative forest restoration projects 
(Vilsack, 2011). 
 Land management administrators, Congress, environmental groups and 
many of the interests in between have stressed more collaboration in wildland fire 
policy for over 15 years.  Despite this increasing focus on collaboration, it is 
important to address how collaboration works and the challenges involved. The 
discussion on the 4FRI revealed some of the tensions posed by collaborative 
processes and a case study on FireScape in Chapter 5 will continue this 
discussion.  Regardless, the broad support for collaborative approaches represents 
a new direction in wildfire management. 
Moving Forward 
 Wildland fire policy and management has changed considerably over the 
last 100 years. The language in more recent policies and the framing of the issue 
reflect the need for proactive management that promotes forest restoration in cost-
effective manners.  The crux of the matter is whether or not these policies will 
allow land management agencies to reintroduce and maintain fire in increasingly 
more complex social-ecological settings. There are still appreciable doubts that 
fuel reduction projects and prescribed fire programs will achieve what is needed; 
“half the year is spent in widespread talk about the need to reintroduce fire into 
fire adapted ecosystems, but the other half of the year is spent suppressing all 
wildfire at substantial economic cost” (Dombeck, Williams & Wood, 2004, p. 
883). These difficulties still produce considerable commentary in a number of 
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academic and political settings that identify shortcomings and offer suggestions 
for sustainable and ecologically sound fire management. Surprisingly, there is 
overlap between what ecologists and policy experts recommend. I conducted a 
review of the literature put forth by prominent restoration ecologists, natural 
resource policy experts, and land managers, and I identified several common 
themes.  I classified these themes as principles, policies, or practices and the next 
section will present a summary of this literature review and my interviews. 
 Principles here are treated as fundamental guidelines on which to base 
policies and on the ground practices.  Three strongly advocated principles to 
guide fire reintroduction are science-based management, landscape-level thinking, 
and integration of management goals.  Many feel that the starting point for fire 
management is good science (Covington, 2000; Noss et al., 2006).  “The most 
effective management decisions can only be made when they are informed by the 
best available science” (Parsons, 2000, p. 281).  Another principle that is an 
offshoot of science-based management is landscape-level thinking. Fire is a large-
scale ecosystem process and crucial to ecosystem management is maintaining 
these processes and allowing them to play their natural role within landscapes 
(Baker, 1992).  As such, fire management needs to be implemented on 
appropriate spatial and temporal scales (Dellasala, Williams, Williams & 
Franklin, 2004).  In practice, this means that fire managers should consider how 
fuels interact with fire behavior on larger scales.  It also implies that fine scale 
treatments need to be carefully placed so that the benefits are integrated within the 
larger landscape. To effectively manage fire, many agree that landscape level 
 
66 
approaches are critical (Stephens & Ruth, 2005; Noss et al., 2006).  Increasingly, 
wildfire policy has shifted to embrace multiple goals and some feel that successful 
policy is that which creates mutually reinforcing objectives (Steelman & Burke, 
2011).  Instead of policy that focuses solely on suppression or fuels reduction, 
practices that also provide the greatest benefit for wildlife habitat, local 
communities, watersheds, etc. are ideal.  For example, carefully planned fuels 
reduction projects can benefit local communities while meeting restoration goals 
(Covington, 2000; Steelman & Burke, 2011).  However, there is also the potential 
for unintended consequences. Post-fire salvage logging is sometimes used to 
remove undamaged fuels from burned areas to reduce future fire risk and to 
obtain products of economic value from affected forests (Bescheta at al., 2004).  
Ecological studies have documented the detrimental impacts of salvage logging 
on wildlife habitat, soils, and overall recovery of impacted areas (Lindenmayer 
and Noss, 2006).  Given the potential for greater harm, restoration treatments 
need to be informed by ecological principles and by feedback from the public and 
scientific community in order to strategically place treatments to minimize the 
impact to sensitive biological and cultural resources (Noss et al., 2006). 
 In terms of practices, the appropriate mix of treatments depends on the 
forest type and the degree of departure from historic fire regimes, and oftentimes 
there is great uncertainty regarding the ideal level and types of treatments 
(Villarreal & Yool, 2008).  Thus, restoration treatments should be extensively 
monitored to inform future treatments. In a broader sense then, practices that 
incorporate adaptive management and strengthen the exchange of knowledge 
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between scientists and practitioners can help inform what practices are most 
suitable for a given area. Coincidentally, academics and specialists within land 
management agencies have consistently called for adaptive management  
(Covington, 2000; Noss et al., 2006, Stephens & Ruth, 2005).  Fire behavior is the 
result of a complex mix of factors and the effects of treatments on forest structure 
and composition vary throughout time and space, underscoring the need for 
management that incorporates post-treatment monitoring, evaluation, and constant 
tailoring. Adaptive management provides systematic feedback to managers about 
the impacts and effectiveness of their approaches. 
 A second practice discussed previously is collaboration. In practice, 
collaboration can take many forms, but one of the more important outcomes of 
collaboration is the transfer of information between scientists and practitioners. 
Strategies that improve the flow of information between scientists and 
practitioners will ensure that the best available science and technologies are 
available to fire managers (Dombeck, Williams & Wood, 2004; Noss et al., 
2006).  Collaborative projects, where multiple parties come together to carry out 
fuel reduction treatments and prescribed fires across jurisdictional and 
administrative boundaries, offers the best hope for reducing the threat of 
catastrophic wildland fire (Stephens & Ruth, 2005). Collaboration is viewed in a 
promising light especially since it can help facilitate projects at larger spatial 
scales (Stephens & Ruth, 2005).  Collaboration is critical if the goal is landscape-
level, adaptive, science-based fire management. 
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 In terms of policies, most will agree that more realistic and multi-year 
funding mechanisms are desperately needed (Steelman & Burke, 2011; Stephens 
& Ruth, 2005).  Forest officers have admitted that it is difficult to plan multi-year 
projects when funding varies from year to year (GAO, 2003a).  If funding for 
reintroduction efforts is not separated from suppression budgets, large fire years 
(which cannot be predicted) drain budgets for restoration work and divert 
resources otherwise needed for fuel reduction projects.  Fire managers also blame 
budget shortfalls for complicating prescribed fire efforts because the funding to 
carry out prescribed fire may not be available when it is needed (Hudson, 2011).  
Thus, funding allocations, such as the 2009 FLAME Act, should be made more 
equitable between suppression and restoration to ensure that planned restoration 
can be carried out (Steelman & Burke, 2011). 
Conclusion 
 Wildland fire management has undergone a significant evolution in 
America since the inception of the Forest Service nearly 100 years ago.  Stephen 
Pyne, a noted and respected fire historian, provides a succinct summary of this 
evolution, “the United States spent about sixty-plus years trying to suppress fire 
and is nearly thirty years along in the effort to restore it” (2004, p. 52).  The 
restoration effort has primarily been characterized by hazardous fuel reduction. 
Policies like the Healthy Forests Restoration Act sought to make hazardous fuel 
reduction quicker and more efficient on public lands by increasing timber sales 
and limiting environmental review.  In recent years however, the restoration effort 
has been characterized by localized, collaborative approaches to accomplish 
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hazardous fuel reduction in hopes that these approaches can increase acceptance, 
acres treated, and the benefits to local communities. The Forest Service has 
started to redefine the wildland fire problem as a shared problem that will require 
collaborative, adaptive, innovative solutions to address.  Though the agency will 
undoubtedly continue to expend vast sums of money and resources on 
suppression, the agency’s commitments to collaborative approaches have grown 
steadily.  If the projects funded by the CFLRP prove successful, the Forest 
Service may be more willing to devote more resources towards this style of 
restoration, Congress permitting. 
 The human landscape surrounding fire has become increasingly complex.  
Despite a marked shift from policies that emphasized suppression to those that 
call for restoration of fire-adapted ecosystems, restoration faces sociopolitical 
challenges.  As the discussion on 4FRI revealed, even though it has the 
involvement of many stakeholders, there is still great potential for controversy in 
collaborative projects. Funding limitations, climate change, continued 
development in wildland areas, and the need to balance restoration with other 
management goals present complex terrain for land managers and restoration 
practitioners. A common criticism of the Forest Service is that the organizational, 
legal, cultural, and ideological remnants of a century-long war against fire still 
exert influence over fire management (Hudson, 2011; Stephens & Ruth, 2005).  
Despite the daunting task at hand, decades of ecological research have contributed 
a set of principles and practices for moving forward, and many of these are now 
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represented in recent policies, like the CFLRP, which promotes and, perhaps more 
importantly funds, landscape-level, restoration projects. 
 Given the complexity of wildland fire management and decades of 
framing and reframing the problem, it is important that new models of fire 
management and forest restoration receive more attention.  Southeastern 
Arizona’s FireScape program is one such project attempting to use the principles 
and practices that have been both difficult to communicate at a national level and 
integrate into practices at a local level.  Those involved in this collaborative effort 
are combining new technologies, the expertise of the region’s scientists, 
managers, and practitioners, and landscape-level approach to achieve fire 
restoration in an efficient, ecologically sound, and socially acceptable manner.  
These efforts are just beginning to receive the type of national and congressional 
support that large fire events procure; yet they invoke a number of questions.  
How do these types of partnerships form?  What contributes to their success and 
failure?  What are the greatest challenges and how can they be resolved?  How are 
they affecting agency culture?  What promise do they hold for forest ecosystems?  
The next chapter will answer these and other questions through a case study of the 
collaborative FireScape initiative in southeast Arizona.  Initiatives like FireScape 
are where the real work and experimentation takes place and represent the latest 
efforts in a long saga to effectively manage, protect, and restore western forests. 
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Chapter 4 
FIRESCAPE: AN EFFORT TO RESTORE FIRE 
Introduction 
 The focus on collaboration as a fire management and forest restoration 
strategy has only seemed to increase over the last decade.  If Congress is going to 
continue to promote these types of projects as models, then in-depth studies, with 
attention to how these projects form and the challenges they face, are helpful.  
This chapter provides a practice-oriented, case study of the FireScape effort to 
explore these dimensions.  Policies and formal positions can only go so far; it 
takes individuals who have committed to working together put these policies into 
action on the ground.  This case study provides a discussion of what this work 
involves.  First I discuss how FireScape formed, what the approach entails, and 
the challenges encountered thus far.  Next, I focus on the benefits of the FireScape 
approach with special attention to FireScape’s NEPA compliance.  For those 
interested in practical applications of this analysis, I have identified several 
critical factors that have helped sustain the FireScape effort.  I end with a 
discussion of FireScape’s broader impacts for fire restoration.    
 I gathered many of the insights into the FireScape from a series of 
interviews with members of the Chiricahua FireScape team.  In spring of 2012, I 
interviewed five key individuals involved in Firescape: two from the Forest 
Service, one from the Natural Resources Conservation Service, one from The 
Nature Conservancy, and one from the University of Arizona.  The interviews 
were semi-structured and lasted on average one hour. The interview questions 
 
72 
covered the following topics: the formation of FireScape, the challenges and 
benefits of the approach, the impact of the Horseshoe II fire, the role of 
collaboration in the process, and the experiences of those involved.  I also 
attended several presentations by FireScape members at workshops and 
conferences. These provided a valuable opportunity to witness how those behind 
FireScape communicate their approach to the fire science and management 
community and to the public.  During these events, conversations with fire 
management practitioners, university scientists, and graduate students also helped 
inform my analysis.   
An Experiment in Collaborative Natural Resource Management 
 In recent decades, collaborative natural resource management (CNRM) 
has become an alternative way to address complex natural resource management 
issues (Conley and Moote, 2003).  Though it goes by many different names, the 
following definition captures the aspects commonly described in the literature on 
CNRM, “multi-party natural resource management projects, programs, or 
decision-making processes using a participatory approach (Conley & Moote, 
2003, p. 372).”  There is a wide diversity of collaborative styles and structures 
that differ in aspects such as scale, level of involvement, and degree of formality 
(Yaffee & Wondolleck, 2010, p. 62).  On a more basic level, CNRM is “simply 
people working together to restore the land” (Dombeck, Wood, & Williams, 
2003).  There has been a noticeable increase in collaboration in natural resource 
management in the U.S. in the last 30 years (Yaffee & Wondolleck, 2010, p. 60).  
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These collaborations focus on estuaries, rivers, wetlands, grasslands, and forests 
and are called partnerships, coalitions, initiatives, councils, and alliances.10  
 The literature on collaborative natural resource management is extensive 
and varied.   A large part consists of case studies documenting specific efforts. 
There is also a growing movement towards evaluating the social and ecological 
outcomes of collaborative efforts and identifying the factors that contribute to 
successes and failures.  Though successful collaborations are the topic of an ever-
growing body of literature, collaboration is a process, underscoring the need to 
complement such knowledge with studies that analyze the challenges facing 
collaborative endeavors and the methods used to overcome them (Yaffee 
&Wondolleck, 2010, p. 62).  In addition, there are a multitude of studies that 
describe the characteristics of successful efforts, but fewer that explore what 
brings people together in the first place (Heikkila and Gerlak, 2005, p. 584).  
Academic researchers are interested in how and why collaborative natural 
resource management projects arise and the next section will discuss factors that 
helped facilitate the formation of FireScape.   
The Formation of FireScape 
 The FireScape effort was set into motion in the fall of 2002 after a 
significant fire year in the Huachuca Mountains.   The Huachuca Mountains are 
part of the Sierra Vista ranger district in the southern Arizona Sky Islands.  
                                                
10 The following works offer case studies on the movement towards collaborative styles of natural 
resource management:  Brick, P., Snow, D., & Van de Wetering, S. (Eds). (2001). Across the 
great divide: explorations in collaborative conservation and the American West. Washington, DC: 
Island Press;  Knight, R.L. & White, C. (Eds). Conservation for a new generation: redefining 
natural resource management. Washington, DC: Island Press.  
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Individuals from the Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, Fort 
Huachuca, and The Nature Conservancy convened informal meetings and agreed 
that present management was inadequately preventing the larger and more severe 
wildfires seen in recent decades.  The District Ranger for the neighboring Douglas 
Ranger District acknowledged that across the Coronado, smaller-scale, and 
isolated fuel treatment and prescribed burns were not going to have a big enough 
impact on the landscape or prevent more severe wildfires: “These are large 
landscapes in which small, individual treatments were not going to get us where 
we wanted to go.  One fuel reduction program [at] a time was not efficient 
(personal communication, 2012).”  Another member in these early talks also 
admitted that planning these small treatments required time, resources, and NEPA 
compliance.  The group decided that piece-meal projects needed to be replaced 
with a more comprehensive and integrative approach to fire planning.  A handful 
of partners formed the Huachuca FireScape project to address these issues and 
seek more efficiency in fire planning.  Thus, on a fundamental level, FireScape 
grew out of local concern and local needs for a different approach to wildland fire 
management.  The Huachuca FireScape paved the way for six other planned 
FireScape projects for other Sky Island ranges.  
 FireScape encompasses seven distinct projects in Sky Island ranges, with 
each FireScape named after the range it covers.11  (The seven projects apply to the 
Catalina-Rincon, Chiricahua, Galiuro, Huachuca, Peloncillo, Pinaleno, and Santa 
Cruz ranges).  Each FireScape is slightly different, reflecting different partners, 
                                                
11 For more information on each FireScape project, visit http://www.azfirescape.org/home. 
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agencies, and ecological needs.  For instance, some Sky Island ranges have more 
of a wildland urban interface while others are less developed and have designated 
wilderness. However, the techniques employed and even the personnel involved 
span across projects. Each FireScape is at a different point in the environmental 
compliance process.  The Huachuca FireScape is the first plan to have a 
completed Environmental Assessment and Biological Opinion, fully completing 
their compliance with both NEPA and the Endangered Species Act. The Catalina-
Rincon FireScape is in the final stages of environmental review and the 
Chiricahua FireScape is still in the process of developing its draft Environmental 
Assessment.   
 
Image 3: There are five districts in the Coronado National Forest 
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 The borderlands region has been the context for several other collaborative 
fire management programs that helped set the stage for FireScape.  The Malpai 
Borderlands Group (MBG) is a partnership formed by a collection of ranchers in 
southeastern Arizona and southwestern New Mexico.  The group has brought 
together ranchers, scientists, and agency personnel to develop science-based 
strategies for fire management and ecological and cultural conservation.  One of 
the Malpai’s pioneering approaches was cross-jurisdictional prescribed fire to 
restore grassland vegetation. The group, and especially their prescribed burn 
approach, have gained national recognition and have been identified by a number 
of experts as a model for successful collaboration (Cash, 2001; Sayre, 2005; 
Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000).  Several members of the Chiricahua FireScape 
team work directly with the MBG and bring their experiences in collaborative fire 
planning to FireScape.  In a region where private landowners, federal agencies, 
and environmental groups struggle to find common ground, the MBG has created 
an environment conducive to collaboration in the region.     
 The MBG also inspired another large-scale fire planning program.  The 
Peloncillo Programmatic Fire Plan was the result of an effort between ranchers, 
some associated with the MBG, the Coronado National Forest, and the Nature 
Conservancy.  This public-private collaboration developed a prescribed fire plan 
to reintroduce fire into the Peloncillo Mountains and neighboring grasslands.  To 
accomplish these goals, the Coronado National Forest formed an interagency, 
interdisciplinary team to create a prescribed burn plan to cover the Peloncillo 
Mountains in entirety, an area close to 50,000 hectares. The plan required an 
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environmental assessment (EA), which they carried out using a single, 
programmatic plan. The biggest concern raised by the environmental analysis was 
the potential impact prescribed burns would have on threatened and endangered 
species.  The appeal of their “programmatic” EA was that it allowed the 
Peloncillo Programmatic Fire Plan to carry out treatments without having to 
repeat the time-intensive environmental analysis and public scoping required 
under NEPA.  Rather, for a proposed treatment the appropriate agencies and/or 
landowners are consulted for approval, upon which treatments can occur.   
 Since 1995, the group has conducted four, landscape-level prescribed fires 
on a mix of federal, state, and private lands.  The parties involved in Peloncillo 
Programmatic Fire Plan all agreed that reintroducing fire on a landscape level as a 
part of a science-based, monitoring effort was greatly needed.  This joint 
agreement on the problem and an appropriate course of action was an essential 
component to the accomplishments achieved thus far.  Both the Malpai 
Borderlands Group and the associated Peloncillo Programmatic Fire Plan were a 
response to the growing concern that continued fire suppression and shrub 
encroachment on working landscapes would contribute to further decline in 
landscape productivity and perhaps eventually, the loss of the historic ranching 
way of life in the region (Gottfried et al., 2009).  These successes in collaborative 
fire planning by the Malpai Borderlands Group and its partners in the associated 
Peloncillo Programmatic Fire Plan created an environment conducive to more 
experimentation.  
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 FireScape was not mandated from above, although it reflects both national 
and local needs. Decades of government evaluations of wildland fire policy, 
which draw upon the recommendations of scientists and policy experts, have 
called for larger-scale, science-based, collaborative planning and management.  
At the local scale, natural resource management professionals, landowners, 
environmental advocates, and fire ecologists envisioned an approach that would 
allow fire to play its natural role in the landscape while protecting the cultural and 
ecological resources so unique to the Sky Islands.  It arose out of shared concern 
for the integrity of Sky Island landscapes and the threat that woody fuel 
accumulation and catastrophic fires pose to that integrity. Much like a small spark 
can ignite a large wildland fire, large wildland fires also serve as the spark for 
action.  Large fire events have not only catalyzed policy revisions at the national 
scale as the previous chapter discussed, they have galvanized collective action at 
local scales.  
The Nuts and Bolts of FireScape     
 FireScape’s unofficial motto is “preserving our mountains by thinking 
big,” which entails planning that covers entire mountain ranges as opposed to 
small patches within forests.  The Coronado’s district ranger offered the following 
definition for FireScape, “a collaborative, cross-jurisdictional fire planning effort 
with the goal of restoring resiliency to the landscapes and restoring fire in its 
natural role” (personal communication, 2012).  The essence of FireScape is 
working at large, or landscape, scales.  Planning at such scales requires multi-
party collaboration between the various agencies and landowners whose 
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jurisdictions are found within the planning areas.  It also requires new scientific 
tools to describe these landscapes and assess the impacts of management actions.  
Thus, FireScape is broad in both geographic and institutional scope.   
 One of the guiding principles in FireScape is to use science throughout the 
planning process to inform practices.  Sound science is part of the nuts and bolts 
of FireScape.  The Chiricahua FireScape project has a “science working group” 
made up of fire ecologists from the University of Arizona and agency scientists.  
This group brings a diverse set of skills to the effort.  The science working group 
has provided technical support and some of the information used in the 
Environmental Assessments.  In order to “think big,” the first significant data 
requirement for the Chiricahua FireScape was a landscape level map of the 
ecological types found within the 500,000-acre planning area.  Each agency had 
its own information, so this required a pooling of data to produce a map that 
displays the size and distribution of ecological types. The second step required 
collecting fire histories so the team could identify which areas have departed the 
most from the historic fire regime in order to help prioritize treatments.  The 
University of Arizona has been instrumental in this pursuit.  Since the Forest 
Service aims to manipulate forest structure to restore a more natural fire regime, 
FireScape also needed information on the types and amounts of fuels present and 
the effects that various treatments and combinations of treatments would have on 
forest structure and composition, threatened and endangered species and their 
habitat, and fire behavior.  
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 In short, restoring fire on an entire landscape requires innovative 
approaches to synthesize and integrate a tremendous amount of data into useful 
information that can guide decision-making.  To accomplish this, FireScape partly 
relies on modeling and advancements in spatial analysis.  For instance, fire 
behavior models are used to study how fires spread and to what severity they will 
burn across landscapes given the vegetation types in question, fuel levels, and 
temperature and precipitation conditions. These models allow managers to model 
fire behavior and severity across any vegetation type before and after treatments, 
which can be used to predict how different fuel treatments or combinations of 
treatments will influence flame length, crown fire potential, and the rate of spread.  
These new tools have enable FireScape to accomplish NEPA compliance at much 
larger spatial extents in a cost effective manner.  Given the inherent uncertainty 
surrounding the impacts of fire on landscape levels and the scale of treatments 
needed to mitigate these effects, these fuel treatment scenarios cannot accurately 
predict future fire behavior but they do improve the ability to plan treatments.   
Challenges  
 FireScape has proposed an ambitious new direction for fire planning in the 
Sky Islands, but landscape-level restoration of fire as a natural process is sure to 
encounter obstacles. Indeed, FireScape has faced difficulties inherent to fire 
restoration and the following section will discuss these in greater detail.  It relies 
heavily upon the experiences of those involved in FireScape and to a lesser extent, 
from the literature on collaborative ecosystem management and fire science.  
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 Resource constraints, such as time, personnel and funding, pose a 
considerable set of challenges to the FireScape effort.  Case studies on 
collaboration commonly cite resource constraints as a major obstacle to 
collaboration (Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000).  Those involved are participating in 
the collaboration in addition to their other primary professional responsibilities; 
FireScape is not just an extension of the work in which they are currently 
involved, it is supplemental.  Many of the Forest Service specialists involved in 
the Chiricahua FireScape are also currently participating in the Environmental 
Assessment for the Catalina-Rincon FireScape, further constraining capacity that 
is already stretched thin.  In addition, The Coronado National Forest is in the 
midst of its forest plan revision, which is a huge undertaking requiring agency-
wide involvement.  Mining proposals have also drawn resources away from the 
FireScape effort.  The Coronado Forest is developing the draft Environmental 
Impact Statement for a proposed copper mine in the Santa Rita Mountains south 
of Tucson.  The mine has met opposition from environmental groups and from the 
greater Tucson community and the Forest Service has held several public forums 
to address issues.  A second mining project already approved has recently been 
challenged by lawsuits from environmental groups.  The time and staff needed to 
oversee the Forest Plan revision and respond to mining proposals and lawsuits 
subtracts resources from the FireScape effort.  Staff turnover can also be an issue 
in collaborative settings (Davenport et al., 2007). Newcomers must quickly learn 
a process that they may be unfamiliar with (Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000).  In the 
Chiricahua FireScape, the district ranger for the Douglas Ranger District of the 
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Coronado National Forest, who is one of the leaders of the FireScape effort, will 
step down and transfer to a new district in 2012.  In interviews, those involved 
highly praised his leadership, dedication, and enthusiasm and expressed unease 
about his departure.   
 Funding limitations are omnipresent in fire reintroduction efforts (Hjerpe, 
Abrams, & Becker, 2009).  Economic challenges complicate science-based 
restoration efforts throughout the Southwest and in other parts of the nation 
(Hjerpe, Abrams, & Becker, 2009).  Literature on forest restoration consistently 
cites the lack of funding for forest restoration as a key challenge.  Regardless of 
the goals of restoration-based projects, fiscal limitations may determine the 
outcomes more than anything else (Hjerpe, Abrams, & Becker, 2009).  Part of the 
challenge is the overwhelming amount of acreage in need of treatments and the 
excessive costs of treating these acres; fire experts estimate that thinning, burning, 
and the associated administrative costs for carrying out multiple year treatments 
for one hectare may cost two thousand dollars on average (Hjerpe, Abrams, & 
Becker, 2009).  If this average were applied to the Chiricahua FireScape project, 
which aims to treat 500,000 acres, it would take an estimated four hundred 
million dollars over the lifetime of the project.  Across the west, this translates to 
literally billions of dollars required to reduce fuel loads and restore fire regimes 
and federal funding remains inadequate (Prestemon, Abt, & Huggett, 2008).  
Other collaborative groups have developed innovative funding mechanisms and 
have partnered with local communities to create markets for forest treatment 
byproducts.  These partnerships have allowed the groups to treat more acres since 
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acres treated can increase if the costs are offset by sales of these by-products 
(Lenart, 2006).  
 In the Sky Islands however, the rugged terrain, mixed forest types, small 
diameter trees, and isolation from processing facilities discourage large-scale 
sales of the wood products that would come from manual fuel reduction work.  
The costs to collect, package, and ship raw materials would likely outweigh any 
revenues, making biomass utilization commercially infeasible in the Sky Islands 
(personal communication, 2012). This presents a significant challenge to the 
FireScape group and it is one felt by collaborative partnerships all over the West: 
“the lack of a large-scale market for small-diameter material poses the greatest 
challenge for collaborative groups and managers attempting to reduce wildfire 
danger and improve forest health” (Lenart, 2006, p. 14).  Instead, FireScape has 
relied on a small pool of money from the agencies to fund their efforts and relies 
more on prescribed burning than manual removal to accomplish fuel load 
reductions.   
 Though there is some congressional funding for restoration projects such 
as the Collaborative Forest Landscape Restoration Program detailed in the 
previous chapter, these funds are often allocated by way of competitive grants, 
and FireScape has lost funding to other projects in Arizona.  Projects that have 
local-commercial involvement are more likely to receive government funds.  
According to one of the FireScape members, “competition for funding really 
creates haves and have nots, and is not a great way to dole out the funds.  If they 
can’t compete and if they don’t have the commercial angle, then they lose out 
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(personal communication, 2012).”  Thus, collaborative fire programs are in direct 
competition for an extremely limited amount of financial support.  Another issue 
the Chiricahua FireScape faces is the effect that the Horseshoe II fire may have on 
future funding: “realistically, I’m afraid the funding is going to be hard to come 
by because the people that hold the purse strings are going to say it burned 
already” (personal communication, 2012).  Though the Horseshoe II fire did 
improve the ecological condition of some areas of the mountain and accomplish 
some needed fuel reduction, nearly 60% of the area within the burn perimeter 
burned at low severity or not at all (personal communication, 2012). With 30,056 
acres unburned and 61,894 acres burned at low severity, there is still much work 
to be done (Bird & Menke, 2011).   
 A potential difficulty in collaborative fire management that has received 
little attention is the impact of fire events on collaborative projects.  There is a 
growing body of work within the literature on the social dimensions of wildfire 
that seeks to understand the public’s perception wildland fire events, restoration 
practices, and wildfire risk.12  There are researchers exploring community 
responses following wildfire events, which may offer some insights into how 
collaborative groups involved in wildfire management might react.  Studies have 
shown that in the wake of wildfires, communities exhibit a “pulling together” to 
assist those in need (Carroll, Paveglio, Jakes, & Higgins, 2011).  Every member I 
interviewed was asked how the Horseshoe II fire impacted him or her on an 
                                                
12 For a recent synthesis on the human dimensions of wildfire, see Daniel, C., Carroll, M.S., 
Moseley, C., & Raish, C. (eds). (2007). People, fire, and forests: a synthesis of wildfire social 
science. Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University Press.  
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individual level and how the fire impacted the collaboration. The responses to 
these questions were varied and nuanced, but some general themes worth noting 
emerged.   
 The after effects of the Horseshoe II fire were dramatic.  Severely burned 
areas resulted in dead trees and blackened soils. According to one member who 
witnessed these effects, “personally, I don’t have to think about future planning.  I 
need to fix what is broke (personal communication, 2012).”  Other members 
expressed that the effects of the fire were difficult to witness even with the 
knowledge that more fire is desperately needed, “to see it literally go up in smoke 
is hard to take. I grew up around here and it was tough even though I recognize 
the benefit myself (personal communication, 2012).”  Wildland fires cannot be 
planned for and are unpredictable. In a reflection that echoed this unpredictability, 
one employee of the Forest Service stated “the Horseshoe II fire put the cart 
before the horse...It just got to us about five years too early in my opinion and I 
think that is unfortunate, because I think the Horseshoe II fire could have been 
almost completely a good thing had we had a chance to do a little bit of the work 
we had talked about in the FireScape planning analysis” (personal 
communication, 2012).  
 Others in the FireScape effort saw the fire in an entirely different light. 
The district ranger acknowledged that Horseshoe II did carry out some of the fuel 
reduction work and burning that FireScape had hoped to pursue.  “I am very 
hopeful that this fire reset the clock for us a little bit and will give us a lot more 
opportunities” (personal communication, 2012).  With some of the fuel reduction 
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work taken care of by Horseshoe II, the FireScape team can reprioritize 
treatments.  Despite these different reactions, all of the members seemed resolute 
in the continuation of FireScape regardless of the aftermath of Horseshoe II.  The 
fire validated the need for approaches like FireScape to help Sky Island 
landscapes get to the point where they can absorb the impacts of large wildland 
fires and persist into the future.  “It [Horseshoe II] does not take away the need 
for FireScape. What was demoralizing is the uncertainty in recovery of severely 
impacted areas.  That’s the real uncertainty and that’s what’s scary.  To get over 
this takes training your brain to accept and embrace and we are really bad about 
talking about this (personal communication, 2012).”   
 As for the planning process, Horseshoe II put FireScape on hold.  Many of 
those involved had to respond directly to the fire, to emergency stabilization 
efforts, to public outreach, etc.  The team was not able to hold its first post-fire 
meeting until March of 2012, almost a year after the fire.  In addition, the fire 
required those involved in the environmental assessment to repeat some of the 
modeling given that the fire changed the vegetation composition.  Since the fire 
severely burned large areas, the ecological site maps also needed to be updated.  
The fire also requires revisions to the fuel maps and the fuel models, since the fire 
drastically altered forest fuels.  These changes will take time, but they are not 
insurmountable.  In the mean time, other fires could impact the Chiricahuas or 
nearby ranges in the Sky Islands, requiring constant adaptability.  The effects of 
the Horseshoe II fire are not confined to the land.  It impacted local residents and 
land management personnel.  Despite these shocks that large fire events can have, 
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those involved in the FireScape effort understand the dynamic nature of the Sky 
Islands and the reality that fire will always be a part of these landscapes. “There’s 
no question that we need to get more fire friendly, people need to get used to 
more fire occurring every year. It’s just a matter of it happening safely, and trying 
to meet resource goals” (personal communication, 2012).    
 Despite the temporary setback, the members of Chiricahua FireScape team 
are moving forward and are determined to get the project through the 
environmental review phase and into implementation.  Just as there are challenges 
unique to the FireScape effort because of the particular social-ecological context, 
there are also challenges faced by similar efforts with which FireScape has not 
grappled.  Most notably is the degree of public support for FireScape.  Other 
collaborative groups that have carried out thinning projects have met opposition 
from communities and environmental groups.  Environmental groups view many 
of these projects as a mechanism for commercial logging groups to gain access to 
forest resources (Hjerpe, Abrams, & Becker, 2009).  The Chiricahua FireScape 
effort has encountered very little public resistance and a review of scoping 
comments for the Chiricahua FireScape project revealed general support for the 
effort.  The public in the region appears to understand that fire is a natural part of 
the region’s ecosystems.   According to one FireScape member the public, “is not 
opposed to treatments that benefit forest health.”  This includes prescribed fire 
and mechanical treatments.  The one element that has raised some concern is 
smoke and the associated health impacts that may arise from prescribed fire 
treatments.  Smoke invariably affects local communities and is one of the more 
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common objections to prescribed fire treatments (McCaffrey, 2006).  A few of the 
public comments for the Chiricahua scoping document raised concerns about 
smoke, which FireScape may need to mitigate with public outreach when the time 
comes to carry out prescribed fire treatments.  
Benefits  
 The previous discussion focused on the challenges faced by those involved 
in FireScape, but this discussion would not be complete without presenting the 
benefits of the FireScape approach.  In the literature on collaborative natural 
resource management, there is often a distinction drawn between the social and 
ecological outcomes of collaborative management.  Since the Chiricahua 
FireScape is still involved in planning, the following discussion will focus on 
social benefits.  Successful collaborations can lead to a number of benefits for 
those involved including increased trust, reduced conflict, better communication, 
and more representation of diverse interests (Schuett, Selin, & Carr 2001; Schuett 
& Selin 2002; Lubell 2004). A tangible outcome of the FireScape project is that is 
has forged a stronger relationship between science and practice by working 
closely with scientists from the University of Arizona. FireScape provides an 
ideal venue for the application of recent fire science.  According to the 
Coronado’s district ranger, bringing together scientists and agency personnel is “a 
huge asset;” “from their standpoint [scientists] they are seeing us trying 
implement stuff they have been saying for a decade now.  So they are seeing their 
research heading into the implementation phase” (personal communication, 
2012).   
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 FireScape’s approach to NEPA compliance is also anticipated to produce 
beneficial outcomes over the long-term.  The various FireScape projects are 
employing Environmental Assessments to guide their planning and decision-
making on the ground. NEPA stipulates that any major action on federal lands 
must produce a detailed review of the potential impacts (Karkkainen, 2002).  In 
addition, NEPA requires public disclosure of these proposed projects through a 
scoping process, which provides the public with the ability to comment and make 
recommendations on proposed actions.  Since fuels reduction treatments have the 
potential to impact soils, watersheds, habitat, etc., FireScape must comply with 
NEPA (Collins, Stephens, Moghaddas, & Battles, 2010).   Coronado’s district 
ranger, generally, fuel reduction projects on the Coronado are typically planned 
on a case-by-case basis, each requiring their own environmental review, which 
resulted in an inefficient planning process and use of agency resources (personal 
communication, 2012).  
 Natural resource policy experts have acknowledged a “process 
predicament” in fire planning, where fire managers are challenged by the time, 
resources, and effort needed to clear the procedural and administrative policies 
required by NEPA for fuels and restoration projects (Steelman and Burke, 2011, 
p. 68).  This was one of the main arguments for the Healthy Forest Restoration 
Act discussed in the previous chapter.  The Forest Service has also contended that 
these planning and procedural requirements have in many cases constrained its 
ability to implement fuels reduction projects (USDA Forest Service, 2002b).  The 
administrative and regulatory requirements stemming from NEPA, forest 
 
90 
planning policies under NFMA, and the various wildland fire management 
policies in some cases can complicate and even delay on-the-ground work 
(Steelman and Burke, 2011, p. 68).  Others have acknowledged that the NEPA 
process creates significant demands on agency resources.  Over the years, the 
average length of the NEPA process has increased (Karkkainen, 2002).  All of 
these concerns are valid as the NEPA process can be very time-consuming, but 
perhaps what matters most is how agency personnel react to these predicaments.  
 Advocates of FireScape see it as an opportunity to comprehensively plan 
and assess impacts across landscapes, while creating a NEPA document with a 
longer lifespan, allowing the project greater flexibility to implement treatments.  
The FireScape Environmental Assessment catalogues the types of treatments that 
may be used in each ecological type and analyzes the impacts treatments may 
have on cultural, biological, and physical resources, but it does not indicate 
precisely when and where treatments will occur.  Some of the agency NEPA 
specialists are worried that the assessment lacks site specificity, which may make 
agencies vulnerable to lawsuits from environmental groups (personal 
communication, 2012). However, the tradeoff is the ability to carry out more 
treatments over a longer period of time in the long run. These landscape level 
Environmental Assessments will also allow the agencies to adapt to changing 
conditions that may be presented by unpredictable wildfire occurrences and 
behavior.  In sum, it gives the agencies an opportunity to pursue flexible, adaptive 
management. 
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 Though it is easy to blame environmental regulations for standing in the 
way of work on the ground, the Chiricahua FireScape team recognizes that the 
investment of time and resources will be rewarded with greater flexibility and 
capacity to carry out treatment once the NEPA compliance is finished.  Since 
funding for fuel reduction treatments is unpredictable, the EA allows managers to 
quickly execute projects as funds become available.  However, climatic 
conditions may derail implementation of prescribed burns even if funding is 
available. To conduct prescribed burns, temperature, wind, and fuel moisture 
conditions must be favorable, but often are not.  According to one member, two 
years ago, conditions in one of New Mexico’s national forests were too wet to 
carry out their planned prescribed burns, for which they had money.  The district 
ranger offered those funds to the Coronado National Forest to carry out 
treatments, but because the Coronado lacked an approved NEPA assessment for 
fuel reduction work and did not have enough time to carry one out, they were 
unable to use the funding.  Now, with a multi-year EA that covers multiple 
treatments across ecological types, implementation can occur when the money is 
available.  In addition, because the EAs apply to the entire landscapes, it also 
allows for treatments across agency boundaries, allowing multiple partners to 
meet their resource goals simultaneously.   
Sustaining the FireScape Effort—Critical Factors 
 FireScape is a complex, regional effort requiring the time, energy, and 
commitment of dozens of individuals and many public and private organizations.  
It is too early to tell what FireScape will be able to accomplish in the Sky Islands, 
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but it is possible to identify the critical factors that have likely sustained the 
FireScape effort thus far.  Strong leaders, a commitment to the NEPA process, 
and effective organization have helped maintained the effort despite this complex 
undertaking.    
 Dozens of other studies of collaborative approaches to ecosystem 
management acknowledge that key individuals are often critical (Olsson, Folke, 
Hahn, 2004; Rydin, 2006; Yaffee, 1996; York and Schoon, 2011).  Though they 
are known by a variety of terms in the literature (policy champions, brokers, or 
entrepreneurs), these individuals bring people together, serve as the focal point for 
trust, and are able to overcome barriers (Rydin, 2006).  For example, agency 
culture can be a barrier to innovative approaches to ecosystem management 
(Cortner & Moote, 2003). Leaders within agencies can be instrumental to 
adopting new approaches and as natural resource policy experts points out, 
“having individuals who make things happen is as important as having formal 
policies on the ground” (Yaffee, 1996, p. 726).  The Chiricahua FireScape has its 
own “local champions” that are committed to seeing FireScape through to 
implementation.  One instrumental leader is the district ranger for the Coronado 
National Forest.  When asked how important his leadership has been to the 
FireScape effort, one member remarked,   
It does make it easier to have someone like [name omitted] who just 
says, “no, we are doing this, we are moving forward and we'll find a 
way to move forward no matter what... no matter if it's a fire or not 
a fire.” You can't do it unless there is someone at the top saying this 
is important because the resource and fire ops [operations] guys 
who are eventually carrying this out or writing the NEPA document 
are going to do what their leadership tells them to do and they are 
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going to prioritize the way the leadership tells them prioritize.  So 
when you have someone like [name omitted] who says, “No, this is 
important, we need to do this, make that a priority.” And he comes 
to every meeting and he says yes to every meeting and he shows up 
with good intentions and he asks employees to make time to do 
these things and gives them deadlines and expects them to follow 
those deadlines and meet those deadlines.  That was imperative 
(personal communication, 2012).  
 
 Another critical factor that has helped maintain the effort is a commitment 
to the NEPA process.  When asked if NEPA was overly cumbersome to the effort, 
several of those interviewed acknowledged that despite the time and energy it 
requires, it is important to use the law the way it was intended, to involve the 
public in a formal process for informed decision-making. According to one Forest 
Service employee, “as cumbersome as it is, the NEPA process was designed and 
used for a reason.  This is public land, the public has to be involved in it and the 
public have to have a say in it.  I think it is crucial, there is no way this holds true 
without it” (personal communication, 2012).  Agency personnel and 
administrators have criticized the NEPA process for being costly, lengthy, and 
burdensome (Karkkainen, 2002).  Many policy experts also criticize the outcomes 
of this process as of low quality or too late in the process to shape real decisions 
(Karkkainen, 2002).   FireScape’s EAs inform the public of the kinds of issues the 
implementing agencies will consider when planning treatments and the effects 
that these treatments could potentially have on various resources.  Given the 
urgent need to carry out more and larger treatments, but the inability to do so, the 
investment in a practical NEPA document that can guide future decision-making 
is invaluable.  
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 A third factor that has sustained the considerable organizational 
requirements of the FireScape effort is the hiring of a project coordinator whose 
sole responsibility is to maintain the inner-workings of the FireScape project. 
Resource guides on collaboration also suggest bringing on coordinators to handle 
the immense tasks of organizing across agencies and groups (Wondolleck & 
Yaffee, 2000).  This person handles scheduling, venue selection, public outreach 
and is the point of contact between the agencies.  If agency specialists need data 
or maps from another agency or group, s/he provides it.  The coordinator is also 
the point of contact for the public and puts those with questions and concerns in 
touch with the right person.  These tasks range from technical, such as pulling 
together all the different pieces of the NEPA public scoping documents and 
creating brochures, to the not so technical, such as ensuring that there are coffee 
and bagels at meetings.  However, these minor details are valuable to the effort as 
a whole.   
 These three critical factors are mutually reinforcing.  Leaders have 
maintained enthusiasm and dedication for the effort while prioritizing a practical 
approach to NEPA.  A dedicated coordinator provides the communication and 
organization needed to maintain the effort.  FireScape provides a venue for those 
dedicated to restoring fire to the Sky Islands to mobilize their efforts.  It brings 
together people who have a stake in the issue into the same room to collectively 
create an ecologically and socially defensible plan to address the implications of 
the lack of fire in these fire-adapted ecosystems.     
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Broader Implications 
 The FireScape approach, and especially the development of 
comprehensive, landscape-level Environmental Assessments, received notice 
from other forest districts and from administrators higher up within the agencies.  
One official within the upper echelons of the Forest Service was “blown away by 
the scale and size of treatments” FireScape is proposing (B. Gebow personal 
communication, 2012).  According to one FireScape member, “the Coronado 
National Forest has gotten a lot of kudos for this (B. Gebow personal 
communication, 2012).”  FireScape has resonated beyond the Coronado.  The 
members of FireScape have been invited to other districts to share their strategies 
and district rangers from neighboring forests have expressed that they would like 
to undertake similar plans for their districts.   
 On a more fundamental level, FireScape is a part of a shift in the region 
regarding the way fire is approached.  When the Monument Fire burned through 
the Huachuca Mountains in June of 2011, those that had been involved in the 
Huachuca FireScape effort saw an opportunity to accomplish some of the 
restoration work they had planned.  According to one of the instrumental 
members of both the Huachuca and Chiricahua FireScape team, the Monument 
Fire provided an opening to jointly accomplish the goals of fire suppression and 
fuel reduction.  By conducting what are termed “burn-out” operations to create a 
fuel break to the advancing fire line, the suppression efforts contained the fire and 
met restoration objectives.  In a presentation to the Southwest Fire Ecology 
Conference, this member had the following to say about the containment strategy 
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applied to the Monument Fire, “we looked at how do we get the work done we 
planned for, in that we had a thousand people on this fire so let’s get work done as 
well as take care of this fire.”   
According to Arno and Fiedler (2005), the use of prescribed fire and the 
types of strategies described above have returned fires to western landscapes on 
an “impressive” scale (p. 195).  Stephen Pyne echoed these conclusions and noted 
that these containment strategies help explain the recent increases in areas burned 
by wildfire (2010, p. 43).  FireScape is a reflection of a broader change the 
direction fire management has taken in the region.  This change ties back to the 
evolution of policies at the national level.  National policies have changed all 
aspects of fire management over the years and what FireScape embodies is an 
integration of local needs and national directives.    
Conclusion  
 FireScape grew out of the concern of local resource managers and 
practitioners, but it reflects the directives of national wildland fire policy.  These 
include collaboration across administrations, jurisdictions, and scales and 
programs that pursue restoration and treatments across more acres more 
efficiently.  There are benefits that extend beyond the proposed project 
boundaries.  The effort has strengthened the network of fire professionals and 
ecologists in the region, created an effective avenue for the transfer of knowledge 
between scientists and practitioners, and is helping the Coronado pursue a more 
proactive, adaptive approach to fire restoration. More importantly, FireScape is a 
part of a bigger shift in fire management started over 30 years ago when the 
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Forest Service abolished their 10 a.m. policy in 1974.  Full suppression is no 
longer an ecological or economical option.   
 There are multiple factors that could derail FireScape.  It may not receive 
the funding necessary to achieve large treatments over multiple years.  It may face 
future opposition from the public or special interests.  An escaped prescribed fire 
could threaten sensitive biological resources or human life and property and 
thereby jeopardize support for prescribed burning.  In terms of restoration, it may 
not achieve appreciable progress in restoring a fire resilient forest structure in the 
Sky Islands.  Despite fuel reduction goals, fire behavior may continue unchanged 
with large catastrophic events the norm.  Future fires may further damage critical 
areas and climate change may lead to temperature and precipitation conditions 
that enhance fire risk regardless of efforts to decrease it.  Despite the great 
uncertainty and possibility for failure, efforts like FireScape are worth the 
investment of time and resources.  Active management is needed to reduce dense 
fuels so that when fires do occur, which they will invariably, the forested areas 
can carry these fires more safely.  Each proposed treatment is an opportunity to 
experiment and each success may help restore more sustainable ecosystems and 
economies to Sky Island forests. The district ranger put it best, “I do think that 
with each successive treatment, whether it’s a wildfire, a prescribed fire, a 
mechanical treatment, we inch closer to the goal of having a resilient, fire 
adaptive ecosystem. We are heading in the right direction” (personal 
communication, 2012).  
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Chapter 5 
CONCLUSION 
 FireScape has implications in terms of wildland fire policy, collaboration, 
and sustainability that extend beyond Arizona’s Sky Islands.  Though the Forest 
Service may have demonized fire in its early years and may be largely responsible 
for the character of some of the more severe wildfires seen today, it cannot be 
primarily responsible for solutions.  The Forest Service needs partners in the 
agencies and private landowners that share its borders.  It needs close 
relationships with university scientists to ensure that the best analytical and 
modeling approaches are available.  Congressional support for restoration is also 
critical.  Without it, the Forest Service cannot fund restoration programs in 
addition to the myriad of other programs it is responsible for overseeing.  The 
public, especially those who live near or within forested areas or enjoy their many 
amenities, must also be supportive of new approaches and willing to participate 
when the opportunities arise.  For its part, the Forest Service needs to ensure that 
agency culture and aversion to change does not prevent innovation and 
experimentation in fire restoration.  In the Coronado National Forest, the Forest 
Service has pursued a new direction for fire management with FireScape.  
FireScape, and other programs like it, represent a new paradigm in wildfire 
management.  The proposed treatments reflect a scale and scope of thinking that 
acknowledges ecological complexity and the urgent need for more strategic fuel 
reduction.  As a regional fire management program, FireScape replaces a 
technocratic model that designated all fire as both socially and ecologically 
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undesirable with one that welcomes fire, appreciates its role in the stability and 
renewal of ecosystems, and most importantly, encourages more of it.  
 The emergence of FireScape is a response to the need for both the 
proactive management of fire and the restoration of fire.  One of the more 
interesting aspects of FireScape is that it is the result of the shared concern of a 
collection of individuals who were frustrated with the status quo and concerned 
with its consequences.  Yet, FireScape reflects the importance placed on fuel 
reduction, restoration, and collaboration in national policies.  In one respect, 
FireScape is a regional response to a nationally defined problem.  One of the most 
critical questions regarding FireScape in relation to fire restoration’s long, and at 
times controversial evolution is whether or not these types of approaches are the 
right ones.  Projects like FireScape, the Four Forests Initiative, and others invest 
an extraordinary amount of time to include a wide variety of interested parties and 
plan treatments that are science-based and strategic. Past policies, like the Healthy 
Forests Restoration Act promoted less collaborative, and less transparent 
planning, which undermined the public’s involvement.  However, collaborative 
approaches are just as vulnerable to controversy and to being underfunded, or not 
funded at all.  The question of right and wrong rests on a deep dilemma in forest 
restoration: is the degree of urgency in restoring western forests such that we 
should implement treatments as fast as possible even if they do not afford broad 
public and scientific support, or, should we plan and implement treatments in a 
more open and democratic manner, even if it is more time-consuming?  
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 The concept of sustainability provides a meaningful framework to address 
this question. Though the definitions for sustainability vary widely, in the context 
of natural resource management, sustainable approaches are those that attempt to 
meet both social and ecological goals over the long term (Bormann et al., 1994, p. 
6).  This framing highlights a very important, but less often communicated point, 
public lands management issues are as much social as they are technical 
(Dombeck, Wood, & Williams, 2003).  As the FireScape case study revealed, 
there is indeed a social nature to science and management.  Creating a planning 
process that is collaborative and inclusive, but also science-based, provides an 
opening to find a balance between what is collectively desired socially and what 
is ecologically possible.  Accomplishing this however, requires agencies to blur 
their administrative lines and form partnerships with other agencies and groups.  
Instead of faulting the environmental review process mandated under NEPA, 
FireScape sees in it an opportunity to coordinate across agencies and 
jurisdictional boundaries while being transparent to the public.  This collaborative 
approach to NEPA is one of FireScape’s more notable achievements so far.  
Public lands issues have always been controversial and will continue to be, but 
FireScape, and other projects that carry out NEPA the way it was intended, 
presents an opportunity to resolve these differences and involve those who have 
professional and personal stakes in the issue.  If sustainability is the goal, then 
finding more efficient and more effective ways to work together that maintain 
trust and relationships is critical.  To understand whether or not FireScape can 
alter fire behavior on a landscape level given climate change and the complexities 
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of ecological systems, incorporating the latest ecological tools and advancements 
is also critical.  Through a strong partnership with some dedicated and innovative 
fire ecologists in the Southwest, FireScape is attempting to find what are 
otherwise elusive answers in fire restoration.    
 If FireScape is implemented to its full potential, the enormous front-end 
effort to classify Sky Island ranges and model the impacts of different treatments 
offers a strong basis for adaptive management.  Social and ecological 
sustainability may very well depend on our ability to respond and adapt to 
conditions as they change over time, which invariably, they will.  Systematic 
approaches like FireScape have taken the time to characterize, to the fullest extent 
possible, the current state of fuels and fire risk, providing a stable foundation for 
ongoing learning.  The stakes are simply too high to miss these opportunities for 
learning.  This will also enable those involved to determine whether the 
investment in time, resources, and personnel is justifiable.  By managing across 
boundaries and managing for change, FireScape comes closer to sustainable 
natural resource management than past approaches.   
 Regardless of this dilemma, the promise of collaborative approaches like 
FireScape is that they bring down the walls between advocates, scientists, 
managers, and the public, and suggest new roles for each.  Scientists become 
advocates, managers become mediators, and the public becomes more aware, 
involved, and supportive of management actions needed to restore and protect our 
public lands.  Collaboration may not be necessary in all public lands management 
issues.  Indeed, there are valid critiques against collaborative natural resource 
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management, but greater demand for increasingly fragmented and shrinking 
expanses of public lands requires some degree of collaboration if large-scale 
ecological processes like fire are to remain intact.  Managing fire, a process that 
has no regard for administrative and ownership boundaries, requires collaborative 
approaches.  Collaboration is essential in fire restoration.  This research supports 
the assertion made in academia that that collaborative approaches provide a 
pathway to implement science-based management of ecosystems (Dale, Agee, 
Long, & Noon, 1999; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000).  
 Dombeck, Williams, and Wood, former land managers and advocates of a 
hopeful future for America’s public lands, rightly acknowledged that fire is 
something that communities and managers throughout the country need to learn to 
live with.  As they point out, “in the long run, restoration of fire will occur in one 
form or another.  How fire returns to these fire-adapted ecosystems is the question 
(2003, p. 180).  Large and catastrophic wildland fires are a threat to ecological 
and economic sustainability.  There seems to be no end in sight to the amount of 
taxpayer dollars that wildland fire will require.  When placed alongside other 
impacts such as climate change, drought, pest outbreaks, invasive weeds, 
development, and human requirements for recreation and amenities, wildfires 
may set the Sky Islands on a new trajectory.  Wildland fire exposes a harsh reality 
that our social and economic needs cannot be met in the long run if we do not first 
protect the ecological integrity of our native ecosystems (Dombeck, Wood, & 
Williams, 2003).  Wildland fire also requires us to strike a balance between what 
is valued socially, economically, and ecologically. But there are inherent 
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tradeoffs.  Socially, we value wide-open space, but also the privilege to own a 
piece for ourselves, which encourages a continued emphasis on fire suppression to 
protect life and property.  Though we understand the need to better equip 
landscapes to handle fire, we still devote a majority of our limited financial 
resources to suppressing fire, which in most cases exacerbates the fuel 
accumulation and high intensity fire problem. In effect, we fail to fund the needed 
work in between these fires, in spite of adequate justification for these 
expenditures in policies that promote restoration and healthy forests.  
 In order to effectively manage ecosystems so that they can sustain 
themselves while sustaining us, we must recognize the magnitude of our past 
actions on ecosystems.  The course we have followed and the direction we now 
choose will also have tremendous impacts on ecological systems in ways that we 
may not yet understand.  These impacts also have significance for us, as human 
and ecological systems are inextricably linked.  FireScape proposes one path, and 
though the outcome is uncertain, the hope is that it will lead to more stable 
landscapes where key ecological processes like fire continue to renew and 
maintain the diversity that makes these landscapes so revered.  Research about 
collaboration in natural resource management is really research about 
relationships.  The relationships between agencies and the publics they serve, the 
relationships between the people who commit to working together despite 
different backgrounds and expertise, and ultimately, the relationships between 
humans and the environment- these links are the essence of collaborative natural 
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resource management.  Collaboration is a way to reconnect the ties we have 
severed to each other and to the land that supports us.  
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